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Abstract
Title II of the Civil Rights Act, along with its counterpart state laws, have
protected the rights of racial minorities in the United States for decades.
Section 1981 has guaranteed contract rights for all people, regardless of race,
since 1868. But times are changing. Racial discrimination claims against
21st century technology companies face challenges when brought under
existing laws. Even the relatively current Communications Decency Act
(CDA) is unhelpful to consumers attempting to seek redress from online
platforms. In this article, we analyze the only cases of consumer
discrimination brought against providers of the sharing economy and
highlight some of the obstacles faced by plaintiffs. Next, we evaluate state
and federal laws commonly relied upon by plaintiffs in traditional consumer
discrimination cases. Our unique contribution involves a detailed review of
outcomes of claims at various stages of litigation from motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment to trials and appeals in both state and federal
court. The study’s results provide lawyers, practitioners, and policymakers
with information about litigants’ success rates and inform our proposals for
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amending the law to accommodate consumer discrimination claims against
online platforms.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Which monkey is gonna stay on the couch?” asked “Kate.”1 “Get your
things and get the f--- out of my house.”2 The African American men who
had booked accommodations in her town home complied and prepared to
leave, but Kate wasn’t finished. As they packed their things, the young Airbnb
host labeled them criminals and stated that she did not feel safe with them in
her home.3 She complained that the party of five was too large and when they
replied that the listing allowed for up to five people, retorted with the
“monkey” comment.4
Flying in from all over the U.S. to meet in New York, the men used the
website Airbnb.com5 to secure lodging for their stay.6 According to Meshawn
Cisero, one member of the party, things “felt off” from the moment they
arrived at the front door around eleven o’clock in the evening, beginning with
their encounter of a resident not mentioned in the listing.7 As they walked
upstairs, the group met a man, described as the host’s spouse, who was “very

1. Dominique Mosbergen, Airbnb Host Kicks Out Black Guests After Calling Them ‘Monkeys,’
HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/airbnb-host-blackguests-monkeys-racist_n_5cf635e4e4b0e346ce845be3.
2. Timothy Bella, ‘Which Monkey is Gonna Stay on the Couch?’: Airbnb Host Kicks Out Black
Guests in Racist Exchange, THE WASHINGTON POST
(June 3, 2019, 3:45 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/03/airbnb-racism-host-monkey-black-men-newyork/?utm_term=.84c69e0c9b67.
3. Id.
4. Mosbergen, supra note 1.
5. About Us, AIRBNB, https://press.airbnb.com/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). Airbnb is
a provider at the forefront of the platform economy. Id. Since its founding in 2008, it has risen to
become one of the most prominent platforms of the platform economy. Id. Airbnb bills itself as “a
trusted community marketplace for people to list, discover, and book unique accommodations around
the world” that “connects people to unique travel experiences, at any price point, in more than 34,000
cities and 191 countries.” Laura W. Murphy, Airbnb’s Work to Fight Discrimination and Build
Inclusion, AIRBNB.COM: THE AIRBNB BLOG 2 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://blog.atairbnb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf.
6. Christina Capatides, Group of Black Friends Kicked Out of Airbnb by Host Who Called Them
“Monkeys,” CBS NEWS (June 4, 2019, 5:49 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/group-of-blackfriends-kicked-out-of-airbnb-by-host-who-called-them-monkeys-airbnbwhileblack/.
7. Aliya Semper Ewing, #AirbnbWhileBlack: Host Calls Black Men ‘Monkeys’ and ‘Criminals’
Before Kicking Them Out [Updated], THE ROOT (JUNE 1, 2019, 8:15 PM),
https://www.theroot.com/airbnbwhileblack-host-calls-black-men-monkeys-and-1835179161
(“‘There was someone’s father with a dog [and they weren’t] described in the posting,’ said Cisero. . . .
The posting noted the owner and spouse would be on site but didn’t mention any additional
residents.”).
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polite” to them and would be so for the duration of their brief stay.8 The host’s
spouse showed them to their rooms—“two private bedrooms on the top floor
of an owner-on-site Upper East Side residence.”9
Getting prepared for an evening out, the friends began playing music.10
Soon afterward, they received their first warning from the host’s spouse,
despite having been previously told that “noise shouldn’t be a problem
because they were on the third floor.”11 The men turned off the music and
continued to socialize.12 It was around the time that a fifth friend arrived at
the residence when they received a second warning from the host’s spouse.13
Shortly after one a.m., Kate confronted the friends.14
Following their removal from the premises, the men contacted Airbnb,
and through its “Open Doors” policy, the company assisted in providing the
group with a new place to stay.15 It took further action to have Kate removed
as a host from the platform.16 In a Reddit post dated June 1, 2019, a user
claiming to be Kate’s boyfriend stated that Airbnb deleted their account,
causing them to lose their bookings.17 But the damage was done. Two days
later, Kenneth Simpson, a member of the group, told The Washington Post
that he remained upset and that the incident was “another real-life situation
where we had to experience the feeling of hopelessness as a black

8. Id.
9. Capatides, supra note 6.
10. Ewing, supra note 7 (“[This] was also stated on the Airbnb listing page for the private
bedrooms.”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Mosbergen, supra note 1.
15. See Bella, supra note 2; see also Fighting Discrimination and Creating a World Where Anyone
Can Belong Anywhere, AIRBNB.COM: THE AIRBNB BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://blog.atairbnb.com/fighting-discrimination-and-creating-a-world-where-anyone-can-belonganywhere/ (“Starting October 1[, 2016], if a Guest anywhere in the world feels like they have been
discriminated against in violation of our policy—in trying to book a listing, having a booking canceled,
or in any other interaction with a host—we will find that Guest a similar place to stay if one is available
on Airbnb, or if not, we will find them an alternative accommodation elsewhere. This program will
also apply retroactively to any Guest who reported discrimination prior to today. All of these Guests
will be offered booking assistance for their next trip.”).
16. Ewing, supra note 7 (“Update: 6/2/19, 7:20 a.m. ET: Airbnb public affairs rep, Ben Breit, gave
the below-written statement to The Root . . . ‘We have a strict nondiscrimination policy, which we are
enforcing to remove the host from our platform.’”).
17. TooN (@Kartoon_1911), TWITTER (June 2, 2019, 10:03 PM), https://twitter.com/
Kartoon_1911/status/1135411639707197440 (hidden under sensitive material; must click “View”).
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American.”18
Corroborating this and other anecdotes in which customers of color
experienced unfair treatment, Harvard Business School researchers conducted
a field study and found that “guests with distinctively African American
names are 16 percent less likely to be accepted relative to identical guests with
distinctively white names.”19 Unfortunately, Airbnb isn’t the only online
platform on which discrimination is revealing itself.20 Another prominent
category of service provider in the platform economy consists of what are
known as transportation network companies (TNCs).21 TNCs include entities
such as Uber and Lyft.22 As with African American guests on Airbnb, African
American passengers on Uber and Lyft are confronted by the prospect of
discrimination.23 In fact, a team of researchers from the nation’s leading
universities conducted a field experiment that concluded as much.24
The study involved research assistants of different races and genders who
hailed rides on Uber and Lyft in Boston, Massachusetts and Seattle,

18. Bella, supra note 2.
19. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. 1, 1 (2017).
20. See Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in
the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L. J. 1271, 1284 (2017). There are a variety of alternative names for
the new business model, including “sharing economy,” “gig economy,” “1099 economy,” etc. Id.
This essay shall adopt the term “platform economy” because the term best captures the intrinsic nature
of the relationship between the online platform and relevant businesses. Id. n.73. Furthermore, the
term properly “encompasses [the] growing number of digitally enabled activities in business, politics,
and social interaction.” Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES
IN SCI. & TECH. 3 (Spring 2016), https://issues.org/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/#:~:text=We
%20prefer%20the%20term%20%E2%80%9Cplatform,%2C%20politics%2C%20and%20social%20
interaction. With the traditional linear model of marketplace competition, businesses “directly create
and control inventory via a supply chain.” Alex Moazed, Platform Business Model—Definition / What
is it? / Explanation, APPLICO, https://www.applicoinc.com/blog/what-is-a-platform-business-model/
(last visited Sept. 19, 2020). Platform models “create[] value by facilitating exchanges between two
or more interdependent groups, usually consumers and producers.” Id.
21. Commercial Ride-Sharing, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS: THE CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES.
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_commercial_ride_sharing.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2020).
22. Id. TNCs operate by “us[ing] mobile technology to connect potential passengers with drivers
who use their personal vehicles to provide transportation for a fee.” Id.
23. See Gillian B. White, Uber and Lyft are Failing Black Riders, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/uber-lyft-and-the-false-promise-of-fairrides/506000/.
24. Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network Companies 1–
2 (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 22776, 2016), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w22776.pdf.
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Washington.25 Drivers for both Uber and Lyft have the option to cancel rides
they schedule with riders, but face penalties if they do so too often.26 In
Boston, the research assistants studied how often drivers cancelled when they
saw that riders had “Black names” versus “White names.”27 The cancellation
rates for Uber riders with African American-sounding names were 11.2% and
8.4% for Black males and females respectively, while they were 4.5% and
5.4% for males and females with White-sounding names respectively.28 With
Lyft, male names of both races had about the same cancellation rate, and
female African American names faced a lower cancellation rate than White
names.29
In Seattle, African American riders experienced longer wait times for
their ride requests to be accepted.30 This finding was particularly significant
in the case of Uber where the wait times for African American riders were
30% longer than for Whites.31 Furthermore, the study found that the travel
time for African American riders on Uber was 8% longer, adjusting for
differences in trip length.32
Ultimately, the study concluded that discrimination is occurring with “at
least some drivers for both UberX and Lyft . . . on the basis of the perceived
race of the traveler.”33 Despite the strong stance taken by providers against it,

25. Id.
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id. at 1–2.
28. Id. at 16–17. The names were chosen from lists that were developed as part of a study wherein
the names selected had been “strongly identified” as White or African American by a panel. Id. at 13;
see Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakeisha
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 998 (2004)
(finding that resumes with White-sounding names received 50% more interviews than resumes with
African American-sounding names); see also Ronald Fryer & Steven Levitt, The Causes and
Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 Q. J. ECON. 767, 801 (2004) (discussing the “stark
differences in naming patterns between Blacks and Whites”).
29. Ge, et al., supra note 24, at 17. The results of both the Seattle and Boston studies appear to
suggest Lyft drivers discriminated against riders of color less frequently than Uber drivers. Id.
However, this finding can be attributed to the different design of Lyft’s platform. See id. at 19. Lyft
drivers see the name and photo of prospective passengers before accepting the trip request, whereas
Uber drivers only see a passenger’s location and star rating—but not the name—before they accept.
Id. With no record of an acceptance, instances of discrimination on Lyft can therefore go unnoticed
as the victim would not even know if the driver has looked at their request and profile. See id.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19.

65

[Vol. 48: 59, 2021]

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

racial discrimination persists as an ever-present threat in the platform
economy.34
What is the “platform economy?”35 Platform models of business allow
for greater diversity of services and new opportunities for connecting with
potential business partners and customers.36 Through “increased information
sharing between different players and circulation of data,” online platforms
eliminate trade barriers and open up economic systems in ways not possible
through traditional models.37 Although some had hoped that old biases would
not infect consumer transactions in the new platform economy, it appears that
discrimination is often facilitated by the most fundamental aspects of the peerto-peer business model, namely the use of profile photos and user names.38
At the top of Airbnb’s “diversity and belonging” page, just above a
picture of CEO Brian Chesky, is a statement declaring discrimination to be
the “greatest challenge” Airbnb is facing.39 Airbnb states that it “exists to
create a world where anyone can belong anywhere.”40 Its “greatest goal” is to

34. See id. Like Airbnb, both Uber and Lyft are aware of, and firmly denounce, discrimination on
their platforms. See Uber Non-Discrimination Policy, UBER.COM: LEGAL, https://www.uber.com/
legal/policies/non-discrimination-policy/en/ (last modified Jan. 12, 2020); Anti-Discrimination
Policies, LYFT.COM, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/115012923767-Anti-DiscriminationPolicies (last visited Sept. 20, 2020). In its community guidelines, Uber informs users that it does not
tolerate discriminatory conduct based on a host of characteristics, including race and national origin.
Uber Community Guidelines, UBER.COM: LEGAL, https://www.uber.com/legal/en/document/?
country=india&lang=en&name=general-community-guidelines (last modified Apr. 17, 2020). Uber’s
non-discrimination policy reiterates its prohibition on racial discrimination and warns that “[a]ny user
found to have violated this prohibition will lose access to the Uber platform.” Uber NonDiscrimination Policy, supra. Similarly, Lyft’s policy emphasizes “maintaining an inclusive and
welcoming community” and that “[d]iscrimination of any kind may result in the offender’s immediate
deactivation.” Anti-Discrimination Policies, supra.
35. See, e.g., Leong & Belzer, supra note 20; Kenny & Zysman, supra note 20.
36. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 20; Kenny & Zysman, supra note 20.
37. Daisy Chan, Freek Voortman & Sarah Rogers, The Rise of the Platform Economy, DELOITTE
1, 2 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/humancapital/deloitte-nlhc-reshaping-work-conference.pdf.
38. See Ge, et al., supra note 24, at 18–20; see also Anne Elizabeth Brown, Ridehail Revolution:
Ridehail Travel and Equity in Los Angeles, UCLA 140–41 (2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
UCLA) (available at https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4r22m57k) (suggesting modifying rider and
photo names policies as means to reduce discrimination on ridehail platforms).
39. Our Diverse Global Community Makes Airbnb Possible, AIRBNB.COM, https://www.airbnb.
com/diversity (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
40. Airbnb, Inc., 2020 Airbnb Update, HOSPITALITYNET (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.
hospitalitynet.org/news/4096620.html.
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“build[] an inclusive platform for all hosts and guests.”41 To that end, Airbnb
has taken steps to remedy the problem of discrimination on its platform.
In 2016, the organization reached out to Laura Murphy, former head of
the American Civil Liberties Union’s legislative office in Washington, D.C.,
to review aspects of the company’s diversity and inclusion efforts.42 Airbnb
adopted several changes Ms. Murphy recommended.43 In particular, Airbnb’s
stronger non-discrimination policy commits “to do more than comply with the
minimum requirements established by law.”44 Specific guidelines for hosts
inside the United States forbid various actions based on race, namely
declining guests, imposing different terms or conditions on guests, or
indicating any racial preference for or against guests when posting a listing.45
Although previously reluctant to modify their policy, in October 2018,
Airbnb announced a booking policy change whereby guests are no longer
required to provide a profile photo and hosts who ask guests to provide one
only see the photo after they accept the booking.46 In addition, hosts must
initiate their request for a photo before they receive a reservation request.47
Under the new policy, guests whose reservations are canceled after they
provide a photo can file a complaint with Airbnb and hosts who violate the
policy may be permanently banned from using the platform.48 Airbnb’s
revised policy represents a compromise between demands from civil rights
groups concerned about profile photos facilitating discrimination and the
interests of rental hosts who want information about guests who have access
to their homes.49
While the platform economy creates new opportunities for growth, its rise
also presents new challenges for society.50 There are increasing concerns that

41. Our Diverse Global Community Makes Airbnb Possible, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Murphy, supra note 5, at 28.
45. Id. at 29.
46. Sam Fulwood III, Airbnb Announces Booking Policy Change to Head Off Outcry Over
Persistent Racial Discrimination, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 24, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://thinkprogress.
org/airbnb-changes-photo-policy-combat-racial-discrimination-4f71c375553a/ (describing Airbnb’s
2018 change to its photo policy).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see Kenney & Zysman, supra note 20 (enumerating the difficulties of adjusting to a
platform economy); Leong & Belzer, supra note 20, at 1271 (describing the potential for
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current law is ill-equipped to deal with the new model where platforms can be
viewed as mere facilitators of peer-to-peer transactions between consumers
and providers.51 Indeed, platforms differ from traditional places of public
accommodation in the sense that they do not provide services directly to
customers.52 Compare hotel and taxi cab companies to Airbnb and Uber,
through which services are provided by hosts or drivers.53 In the new business
model, there is a degree of separation between the platforms and consumers
that may be effective in shielding them from the reach of anti-discrimination
laws.54 Plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against online platforms are presented
with challenges because these companies operate in what is largely a gray area
of the law.55 Furthermore, it is unclear that current laws provide adequate
protection for consumers of color in the brick-and-mortar marketplace.56
We begin this paper by examining the three consumer discrimination
cases to date brought against sharing economy platforms. These three suits in
which plaintiffs of color sought redress from Uber and Airbnb are analyzed in
detail.
In Part III, we examine the effectiveness of state public
accommodations laws in comparison with the federal laws that aim to provide
plaintiffs with relief from consumer discrimination. Our unique analysis of
current law presented in Part IV explores plaintiffs’ success at different stages
of litigation, from surviving defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment, to jury and bench trials, and finally, to appellate review
in both state and federal court. Suggestions for amending the law to ensure
fairness for plaintiffs when they bring claims against platform economy
providers are presented in Part IV.
discrimination in platform economies).
51. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 20, at 1271 (describing the inapplicability of current
discrimination law to the platform economy); Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against
Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1183, 1186–87 (2017) (explaining the
influence of platform design on customer interactions).
52. See Kenney & Zysman, supra note 20 (contrasting the platform economy with traditional
companies that ship goods to consumers).
53. See id.
54. See Chitra Ramaswamy, ‘Prejudices Play Out in the Ratings We Give’–The Myth of Digital
Equality, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/feb/20/airbnb-uber-sharing-apps-digital-equality; see also Levy & Barocas, supra
note 51, at 1187 (“Platforms routinely disclaim legal responsibility for all kinds of harms propagated
by their users against one another, and have largely been successful in so doing.”).
55. Levy & Barocas, supra note 51, at 1186–87.
56. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the history of anti-discrimination laws and their
ineffective enforcement).
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II. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS CLAIMS AGAINST ONLINE PLATFORMS
We begin with a description of the only cases in which consumers have
alleged race discrimination against online platforms. All three cases were
decided by federal district courts in Oregon, the District of Columbia, and
New York.
A. Harrington v. Airbnb
Patricia Harrington, an African American woman residing in the state of
Oregon,57 contacted Airbnb through her attorney, requesting to become a
member because she was aware of the greater likelihood that she would face
discrimination when attempting to book accommodations through the online
platform.58
To appreciate Ms. Harrington’s concern, it is important to understand that
Airbnb users are divided into two types: hosts and guests.59 Hosts “create
profiles for themselves and their property, choose their own price and
availability, and set guidelines for guests.”60 Guests review host listings and
may choose to initiate communication.61 Prior to the change in the company’s
policy in October 2018, as previously mentioned, both guest and host profiles
contained photos and reviews from previous transactions, which could be
viewed by the parties prior to beginning a new transaction.62 If the guest
requests to use the host’s listing and the host agrees, the two parties “use
Airbnb to confirm travel dates and expectations, and make and receive
payments.”63 After the guest has completed his or her stay at the host’s
property, the two parties review each other, publishing their reviews in
postings that are available for reference to other users in future transactions.64
Harrington’s lawyer demanded an end to the policy requiring guests to
provide a profile photo that hosts could see prior to accepting a booking

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Complaint ¶ 1, Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY (D. Or. April 7, 2017).
Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.
Id. ¶ 5.
Murphy, supra note 5, at 2.
Complaint, supra note 57, ¶¶ 13–14.
Fulwood, supra note 46.
Murphy, supra note 5, at 2.
Id.
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request.65 Airbnb explicitly refused to change its photo policy.66 However,
the company offered to help Harrington in securing alternative
accommodations in the event that a host discriminated against her in the
future.67
Harrington filed a class action suit on March 6, 2017, in Multnomah
County Circuit Court.68 She alleged one claim under Oregon Revised Statute
(ORS) 659A.403 “on behalf of ‘[a]ll African-American residents of Oregon
who are not currently, and have never been, members of Airbnb.’”69 In her
complaint, Ms. Harrington alleged that Airbnb is directly liable for
maintaining policies that “deny African-Americans full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of a place of public
accommodation” and “liable for aiding and abetting its hosts in unlawful
discrimination . . . based on protected characteristics.”70
The case was removed to federal court, and on September 6, 2017, Airbnb
moved to dismiss Harrington’s lawsuit based on two contentions: 1) that
Harrington and co-plaintiffs had no claim as the lawsuit concerned “only the
possibility of future discrimination” and 2) that Airbnb was not “a ‘place of
public accommodation’” as defined under ORS 659A.400(1).71 The court
agreed with Airbnb, concluding that the words “has been made,” made it clear
that the statute only pertained to past acts of discrimination.72 Because the
statute does not protect plaintiffs from future discrimination, the magistrate
judge recommended dismissing Harrington’s suit without considering

65. See Complaint, supra note 57, ¶ 25.
66. See Fulwood, supra note 46.
67. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (D. Or. 2018). Airbnb would
investigate any discrimination claims and take appropriate action if necessary. Id. Airbnb’s
amenability to assisting Harrington may be based on the company’s awareness, through its own
research, that minority users on its platform face difficulties in securing bookings based on their
protected characteristics. See Murphy, supra note 5, at 16 (“Airbnb’s research also has generally
confirmed public reports that minorities struggle more than others to book a listing.”).
68. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2017 WL 3392496, at *1 (D. Or. 2017).
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id.
71. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2018 WL 3148245, at *1–2 (D. Or. 2018)
(emphasis added).
72. Id. at *4 (“ORS 659A.885(7) limits who may bring suit: ‘Any individual against whom any
distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
national origin, marital status or age, if the individual is 18 years of age or older, has been made by
any place of public accommodation, as defined in ORS 659A.400.’” (emphasis added) (citing ORS
659A.885(7))).
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whether Airbnb is a place of public accommodation under ORS 659.400(1).73
The district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate and
granted Airbnb’s motion to dismiss on April 13, 2018.74 However, Harrington
was given a fourteen-day period to file an amended complaint.75 Joined by
two additional named plaintiffs, Carlotta Franklin and Ebony Price,
Harrington filed a First Amended Class Action Allegation Complaint (FAC)
on April 27, 2018.76
Once again, Airbnb moved to dismiss the case, asserting plaintiffs failed
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.)
12(b)(6).77 This time, U.S. District Judge Michael H. Simon denied Airbnb’s
motion to dismiss the FAC.78 He reviewed the FAC under the standard of
facial plausibility, where the complaint must plead “factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,” and held that Harrington and her co-plaintiffs met their
burden of demonstrating that they were treated unequally because of their race
and that they were injured as a result of unequal treatment under the Oregon
Public Accommodations Act (OPAA).79
In denying Airbnb’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the plaintiffs
sufficiently pleaded that “Airbnb intentionally [made] many of the
accommodations listed on its online platform unavailable to Plaintiffs and
others on account of their race by maintaining policies that enable hosts to
refuse service to prospective guests who are African-American.”80 They also
adequately pleaded circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent by
establishing that Airbnb possessed more than mere knowledge of the
discriminatory effects of its policies.81 Given its knowledge of discriminatory
behavior conducted via its platform, Airbnb “designed, imposed, and
recommitted to features (specifically, its mandatory photograph policy) . . . in
order not to lose the business of hosts who seek to discriminate on the basis

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at *5–6.
Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-558-YY, 2018 WL 1778596, at *3 (D. Or. 2018).
Id.
Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2018 WL 6133726, at *1 (D. Or. 2018).
Id.
Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1086–87 (D. Or. 2018).
Id. at 1089–91.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
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of race or color.”82
U.S. District Court Judge Michael H. Simon agreed with the plaintiffs
that profile photographs did not reveal the kind of information Airbnb said
they did, namely whether the guests were “reliable, authentic, and committed
to the spirit of Airbnb.”83 However, they did reveal the race and color of the
prospective guest.84 Accordingly, Ms. Harrington and her co-plaintiffs were
able to allege that Airbnb’s justification for its photo policy was a pretext for
discrimination.85
Because plaintiffs adequately alleged intentional discrimination, the court
moved on to decide the next issue: whether Airbnb is a place of public
accommodation under the OPAA.86 Airbnb argued that it could not be
considered a place of public accommodation under the OPAA because of the
indirect nature of its relationship with guests.87 In addition, Airbnb argued
that it is a “distinctly private” organization which excludes it from the
statutory definition of a public accommodation.88 The court disagreed.89
First, Judge Simon explained that Airbnb’s status as a private entity was
a different question from whether hosts were private entities under the
OPAA.90 He concluded that Airbnb’s membership requirement for hosts was
by itself insufficient to qualify it as a private entity because “entities still may
be open to the public ‘de facto’ when they are ‘so unselective in their
membership criteria that they are effectively public.’”91
Second, the court found that the OPAA covers both places and services
that are offered to the public.92 Reviewing the OPAA’s definition under the
broad standard intended by the Oregon Supreme Court, Judge Simon held that
Airbnb offers a “service using its online platform to browse, locate, book, and

82. Id.
83. Id. at 1090–91.
84. Id. at 1090.
85. Id. at 1090–91 (explaining that the photograph requirement was discriminatory because it
revealed the ethnicity of guests, not their character).
86. Id. at 1092.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1092–93 (quoting Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 43 P.3d 1130,
1135 (2002)).
92. Id. at 1093.
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pay for accommodations in private homes.”93 In August 2019, the parties
announced that they reached a settlement for an undisclosed amount.94
Whereas Ms. Harrington’s case dealt with the prospect of future
discrimination on Airbnb’s online platform, the next case concerns an incident
of discrimination that had already occurred.95
B. Selden v. Airbnb
Plaintiff Gregory Selden, a young African American man, used Airbnb to
book a room in Philadelphia in March of 2015.96 Finding a listing he liked,
he tried to book it but was told by the host that it was unavailable.97
Continuing his search, he once again came across the listing still open and
available for booking.98 Suspicious, Selden created two fake accounts with
the White-sounding names “Todd” and “Jessie.”99
Selden applied for the listing under both fake accounts and both were
accepted.100 When he confronted the host, the response was, “people like you
always victimize yourselves solely on the basis of skin color.”101 Selden
publicized the exchange on his Twitter account using the #airbnbwhileblack
hashtag102 and received a number of similar stories from other users.103
On May 17, 2016, Selden filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court
93. Id. at 1093. “The Oregon Supreme Court has declared that the definition of a place of public
accommodation under the OPAA ‘is intended to be a broad one and to apply to all types of businesses
which offer goods and/or services to the public.’” Id. (quoting Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551
P.2d 465, 469 (1976)).
94. Kiersten Willis, Black Oregon Women Score Undisclosed Settlement in Discrimination Suit
Against Airbnb, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Aug. 19, 2019), https://atlantablackstar.com/2019/
08/19/black-oregon-women-score-undisclosed-settlement-in-discrimination-suit-against-airbnb/.
95. Rachael Krishna, This Black Man Was Rejected by an Airbnb Host—Then Was Accepted
Under a Fake White Profile, BUZZFEED NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/krishrach/thisblack-man-was-rejected-by-an-airbnb-host-then-was-accep (last updated May 6, 2016, 12:42 PM).
96. Russell Brandom, Airbnb’s Terms of Service Just Blocked a Racial Discrimination Case, THE
VERGE (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:36 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/1/13487510/airbnb-terms-ofservice-racial-discrimination-arbitration.
97. Krishna, supra note 95.
98. Brandom, supra note 96.
99. Id. One of the profiles shared similar characteristics with Selden, while the other was slightly
older. Krishna, supra note 95.
100. Krishna, supra note 95.
101. Id.
102. Brandom, supra note 96.
103. Id.
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for the District of Columbia.104 The sole named plaintiff, Selden, alleged that
Airbnb violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a;
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3604.105 Airbnb moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration
clause contained in the contract Selden agreed to when he signed up for the
service.106 The issues presented before the court were (1) whether Selden had
agreed to Airbnb’s Terms of Service; (2) if so, whether the mandatory
arbitration clause applied to his claims of race discrimination; and (3) if the
clause applied to his claims, whether it was enforceable.107
On the first question, the court found that Selden agreed to Airbnb’s terms
of service.108 It classified Airbnb’s Terms of Service Agreement as an online
adhesion contract of the “sign-in-wrap” subtype.109 Citing the case of Berkson
v. Gogo LLC, the court identified three instances in which district courts tend
to uphold sign-in-wrap agreements, the first being if “the hyperlinked ‘terms
and conditions’ is next to the only button that will allow the user to continue
use of the website.”110 The court found that Airbnb’s sign-in-wrap agreement
met this criterion because the sign-up box was placed “in roughly the middle
of the page, in close proximity to all three sign-up buttons.”111 Furthermore,
it was “clearly legible, appropriately sized, and unobscured by other visual
elements.”112
The court also took the opportunity to make the point that, given the
ubiquity of online contracting for consumer services, “[a]ny reasonably-active
adult consumer will almost certainly appreciate that by signing up for a
particular service, he or she is accepting the terms and conditions of the
104. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933(CRC), 2016 WL 6476934 at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 1,
2016).
105. Id. (“Selden alleges that Airbnb violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a, which prohibits race discrimination in public accommodations; the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits race discrimination in the formation of contracts; and the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibits race discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *4.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *5 (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 401). The other two conditions
were 2) if “the user ‘signed up’ to the website and was presented with hyperlinks to the terms of use
on subsequent visits;” and 3) if “notice of the hyperlinked terms and conditions is present on multiple
successive webpages of the site.” Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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provider.”113 Therefore, Selden was aware that he was contracting with
Airbnb and indicated his acceptance of the terms and conditions of the
agreement when he clicked the sign-up box.114
Next, the court considered whether the mandatory arbitration clause
applied to Selden’s claims of racial discrimination.115 The clause read as
follows:
[The User] and Airbnb agree that any dispute, claim or controversy
arising out of or relating to these Terms or the breach, termination,
enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, or to the use of the
Services or use of the Site or Application (collectively, ‘Disputes’)
will be settled by binding arbitration.116
Applying California law,117 the court interpreted the language of the
agreement broadly, following U.S. Supreme Court precedent which supports
a broad reading.118 Accordingly the court found it “clear that Selden’s claims
of unlawful racial discrimination ‘ar[ose] out of or relate[d] to’ his use of the
Airbnb service.”119
Lastly, the court addressed the enforceability of the arbitration clause in
Selden’s case.120 It reviewed Selden’s two main arguments: “first, that federal
civil rights claims are not subject to arbitration; and second, that the arbitration
clause is unconscionable.”121
The court disagreed with Selden’s argument that “the Congressional
intent for ‘where and how’ [he] can bring his Title II suit is clearly
codified.”122 While Title II states that “[t]he district courts of the United States

113. Id.
114. See id. While “not directly under the first or second alternative sign-up buttons, any
reasonably-observant user would notice the text and accompanying hyperlinks.” Id.
115. Id. at *6.
116. Id.
117. See id. at *6 n.3. Since the court found that a valid agreement existed between Selden and
Airbnb, it applied California law in accordance with the agreement’s choice of law terms. Id.
118. Id. at *6 (mentioning the Supreme Court’s finding in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624 (1985) that it was proper to interpret an arbitration
agreement contract “broadly to cover matters that touch upon the contract to be arbitrable”).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *7.
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shall have jurisdiction of proceedings initiated pursuant to this subchapter,”123
the court held that this provision “neither guarantees a right to a federal court
trial nor forbids arbitration as an alternate forum.”124 And, although the statute
states that “[t]he remedies provided in this subchapter shall be the exclusive
means of enforcing the rights based on this subchapter,” the court found that
“[p]laintiffs may still vindicate their statutory rights in arbitration.”125
Selden argued that arbitrations are not neutral because businesses, as
“repeat-player[s]” in arbitration, have greater experience in choosing
arbitrators who will lead to decisions in their favor.126 The court rejected this
contention citing a lack of judicial support,127 and referring to Supreme Court
precedent which “repeatedly rebuffed these arguments as insufficient to
preclude arbitration.”128
With respect to Selden’s contention that the agreement was an adhesion
contract, and thus procedurally unconscionable, the court held that “adhesion
contracts are not per se unconscionable under California law.”129 Secondly,
the Terms of Service did not lack mutuality because they “clearly subject[ed]
both parties to arbitration.”130 The court concluded that Selden’s argument
that arbitration is too costly for the average consumer lacked merit, given that
the arbitration fees would be paid by Airbnb.131 Therefore, the agreement was
neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.132
Granting Airbnb’s motion to compel arbitration, the court stayed the
case.133 Unable to appeal during the stay, Selden moved to certify the order
for an interlocutory appeal, asking the court to dismiss the case in the
alternative.134 Selden’s motion was denied.135

123. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6).
124. Id. (citing Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 678 (5th Cir. 2006)).
125. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6). “Any arbitration agreement that prevents them from doing
so is invalid.”).
126. Id.
127. Id. at *8.
128. Id. at *7 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634
(1985)).
129. Id. at *8.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *9.
134. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-933(CRC), 2016 WL 7373776, at *1 (D.D.C Dec. 19, 2016).
135. Id. at *3. The standard for certifying interlocutory appeals is demanding, and “even more
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On the question of whether Selden’s civil rights claims were subject to
arbitration, the court cited “clear authority” from the Supreme Court, “holding
that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA [Federal
Arbitration Act] without contravening the policies of congressional
enactments giving [individuals] specific protection against discrimination
prohibited by federal law.”136
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed
Selden’s appeal on February 2, 2017.137 It granted a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction filed by Airbnb while holding that “[t]he district court’s
order compelling arbitration and staying litigation pending arbitration is not
appealable.”138 On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court denied Selden’s “writ
of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.”139
C. Ramos v. Uber140
In contrast with Selden, Ramos v. Uber Tech., Inc. presents an instance
where the victim of discrimination was successful in challenging the validity

stringent where the Court has compelled arbitration.” Id. at *1. Selden argued that “appellate guidance
is needed on this issue because ‘the [C]ourt did not . . . cite to any authority from the D.C. Circuit with
respect to the nature of electronic bargaining or online adhesion contracts.’” Id. However, “the Court
did not cite authority from the D.C. Circuit on this issue because both parties agreed that California
law governed the question of contract formation. . . . [A]n electronic adhesion contract must be upheld
under California law if its terms are clear and conspicuous.” Id. “[A]s far as the Court [was] aware,”
the D.C. Circuit had not addressed the issue of “whether district courts must stay proceedings after all
claims have been referred to arbitration and a stay has been requested, or whether they retain the
discretion to dismiss such cases outright.” Id. at *2 (quoting Goodrich v. Adtrav Travel Mgmt., 15cv-899, 2016 WL 4074082, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. 2016)). Nonetheless, the issuing of the stay
“comport[ed] with recent practice in this district.” Id. It also conformed to the “FAA’s text, structure,
and underlying policy” that “permit[ted] immediate appeal of orders hostile to arbitration . . . but
bar[red] appeal of interlocutory orders favorable to arbitration.” Id. (quoting Katz v. Cellco
Partnership, 794 F.3d 341, 345 (2d. Cir. 2015) and Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000)).
136. Id. at *2.
137. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 681 F. App’x. 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
138. Id. Selden failed to show “that the order is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), because
it does not have the ‘practical effect’ of denying an injunction that ‘affects predominantly all of the
merits’ or ‘might have a serious perhaps irreparable, consequence.” Id. He further failed to show that
it was appealable “under a pendent jurisdiction theory . . . or the collateral order doctrine.” Id.
139. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 222 (Mem.) (2017).
140. 77 N.Y.S.3d 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).

77

[Vol. 48: 59, 2021]

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

of an arbitration clause in a suit against an online platform.141 On July 20,
2016, plaintiff Elizabeth Ramos used the UberWAV app to try to hail an
accessible vehicle from her home in Starrett City, Brooklyn.142 Ramos, then
fifty-four years old, had been using “a wheelchair since she was 12 due to
scoliosis.”143 She tried the app three times over the course of an hour but was
never provided with a vehicle.144
Ramos filed suit on July 29, 2016, alleging violations of New York
Executive Law § 296 (2), the State Human Rights Law.145 She additionally
“assert[ed] a claim for violation of the Administrative Code of the City of
New York § 8-107 (4) and the New York City Human Rights Law.”146 In
response, Uber filed a motion to compel arbitration, supported by the
affidavits of two employees.147
With arbitration being a “favored method of dispute resolution in New
York,” the issue of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate is to be
decided by the courts.148 The agreement to arbitrate must be “clear, explicit
and unequivocal, in order for the court to compel arbitration, and must not
depend upon implication or subtlety.”149
Uber argued that Ramos’s registration with Uber constituted a necessary
acceptance of “Uber’s terms and conditions which included an agreement to
arbitrate.”150
Describing himself as a “Technical Lead Manager,” Chris Brauchli
claimed that he “ha[d] access to Uber’s records regarding when and where
riders create accounts.”151
He attached three screenshots to his affidavit: 1) “CREATE AN

141. See id. at 302; see also Dan Rivoli, Uber Slammed in Lawsuit over Accessibility by Brooklyn
Woman Who Uses Wheelchair, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2016, 8:08 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/disabled-brooklyn-woman-slams-uber-accessibilty-lawsuitarticle-1.2742076.
142. See Rivoli, supra note 141.
143. See id.
144. Ramos, 77 N.Y.S.3d at 297.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 298.
148. Id. (quoting Markowits v. Friedman, 144 A.D.3d 993, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)).
149. Id. (citing Sutphin Retail One, LLC v. Sutphin Airtrain Realty, LLC, 143 A.D.3d 972, 973
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016)).
150. Id. at 299.
151. Id.
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ACCOUNT,” which displays the first step in the registration process; 2)
“CREATE A PROFILE,” where the registrant would enter their first and last
name; and 3) “ADD PAYMENT,” where the registrant would enter their
payment information.152 Despite claiming that Ramos registered for Uber on
November 4, 2015, Brauchli failed to “annex a copy of the screenshot of the
‘Terms & Conditions’ that would have appeared had Ramos clicked the
phrase ‘Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy’ displayed in the rectangular
box” in the “ADD PAYMENT” screenshot.153
The court disagreed “with Brauchli’s contention that the framing of the
phrase ‘Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy’ within [the] rectangular box
[gave] reasonable notice to anyone that it [was] a clickable button.”154 The
“ADD PAYMENT” screen’s language was ambiguous “on its face.”155 A
registrant could reasonably believe that the Terms and Conditions pertained
to using a “facebook [(sic)] account or email and mobile number for sending
bills and receipts.”156 Moreover, the instructions on the “ADD PAYMENT”
screen did not contain “any indication advising the applicant that clicking on
the words ‘Terms & Conditions and Privacy Policy’ will take the applicant
to another screen purportedly containing Uber’s terms and conditions.”157
The court ultimately held that Ramos did not “clearly, explicitly and
unequivocally” agree to arbitration when she signed up for Uber.158 “Uber’s
motion improperly depend[ed] upon implication or subtlety in the
interpretation of its ambiguous registration process.”159 It denied Uber’s
motion to compel arbitration and compelled the company to interpose an
answer within thirty days of the order.160
As of this writing, Harrington, Selden, and Ramos are the only consumer
discrimination cases brought against sharing economy platforms in which
judges have rendered decisions. The mixed outcomes of these cases do not
yet reveal whether the current laws will serve as adequate tools to protect
victims of consumer discrimination in the platform economy. In fact, it is

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
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unclear whether the current laws—either state or federal—sufficiently address
the issue of consumer equality. Our focus next turns to whether the extant
laws are successful in removing obstacles to full participation for all in the
marketplace.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL VS. STATE LAWS IN PROVIDING RELIEF
FOR CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION
In this part, we assess the effectiveness of federal and state laws by
reviewing the statutes’ language and comparing the decisions in which courts
have interpreted them. Plaintiffs generally rely on two federal laws when
seeking redress for consumer discrimination: Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
A. Public Accommodations Statutes
Title II is the federal public accommodations law.161 Forty-five states
have their own version of public accommodation laws covering nondisabled
individuals.162 Only Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and
Texas do not have state public accommodation laws covering nondisabled
individuals.163 All of the state laws cover discrimination on the basis of race,
as well as sex, ancestry/national origin, and religion/creed.164
1. Federal Public Accommodations Law
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[a]ll persons shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
162. State Public Accommodation Laws, NCSL (Apr. 4, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civiland-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx.
163. Id.
164. Id. Some states’ statutes provide protection for individuals based on their membership in other
categories such as: “marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual
orientation . . . pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression, disability[,] . . . [and]
liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West
2020). California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act also protects against discrimination based on medical
condition, genetic information, primary language, and immigration status. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West
2016). The District of Columbia’s public accommodations law covers individuals based on personal
appearance, family responsibilities, “matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place of
residence or business.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.31(a) (West 2001).
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privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”165
To qualify as a place of public accommodation under the Act, an
establishment’s operations must affect interstate commerce.166
The
establishment must also be among those enumerated in the statute, which
includes inns, restaurants, and theaters, as well as “any establishment . . .
physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered
by this subsection.”167
Federal courts have construed this statute narrowly to exclude any type of
establishment not included on the list. For example, in McCrea v. Saks,
Inc.,168 the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that retail establishments were not covered by Title II.169 The plaintiff,
Theresa McCrea, was shopping at defendant’s retail store when she got into
an argument with a salesman who complained about her young daughter
running through store aisles.170 The salesman called security, ordering them
to “get this ‘n-----’ out.”171 The court reasoned that the statute’s explicit
reference to “cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters, and any facility ‘located
on the premises of any retail establishment’” clearly evinced Congress’ intent
to exclude retail establishments from its ambit.172 Had Congress not intended
as such, there would have been no need for such a provision.173
Similarly, in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that they were
denied service by a hair salon in violation of Title II.174 The court
acknowledged that, “[t]here [could] be no doubt that plaintiffs have presented
not only strong but direct evidence of the salon’s intent to discriminate.”175
Indeed, the plaintiffs were expressly told that “the salon did not ‘do black

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
Id. at § 2000a(b).
Id. at §§ 2000(b)(1–4).
No. CIV. A. 00-CV-1936, 2000 WL 1912726 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2000).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. McCrea and her family ultimately left without making their intended purchase. Id.
Id. at *2 (quoting § 2000a(b)(2)).
Id.
456 F.3d 427, 429 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 434.
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people’s hair.’”176 Nonetheless, the court held that salons were not covered
under Title II because they were not explicitly “mentioned in any of the
numerous definitions of ‘place of public accommodation.’”177 The court
disagreed with the plaintiffs’ characterization of the salon as a “place of
exhibition or entertainment” because the functions of a salon are not akin to
those of an entertainment venue such as a theater or symphony.178 The
specificity used by Congress in delineating certain types of entertainment
venues ruled out any establishments that could have any tangential
entertainment value.179 Furthermore, establishments such as salons are so
common as to preclude any omission of their inclusion in the statute as mere
oversight.180
Beyond the fairly narrow scope of the statute’s coverage, the
effectiveness of Title II is limited in part because it provides only for
injunctive relief to the exclusion of monetary damages.181 Therefore, a second
threshold issue for Title II plaintiffs is whether they have standing to pursue a
claim for injunctive relief.182 A plaintiff must demonstrate a “real and
immediate threat of repeated injury,”183 by “[setting] forth the likelihood of a
future encounter with the defendant which is likely to lead to a similar
violation of some protected right.”184 The “real and immediate threat”
requirement enables defendants to defeat racial discrimination claims based
on one-off encounters.
In Macer v. Bertucci’s Corp., the improbability of future injury was used
to defeat plaintiff’s claim in which she alleged discrimination at a Bertucci’s
restaurant.185 According to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, plaintiff’s complaint “include[d] no allegations that defendant
176. Id. at 435. Allegedly, the salon’s manager explained that “each and every one of the eight or
nine hair stylists present refused to work on [plaintiff] Jean Denny’s hair.” Id.
177. Id. at 431.
178. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3) (1964)).
179. Id. at 434.
180. Id.
181. Macer v. Bertucci’s Corp., No. 13-CV-2994(JFB)(ARL), 2013 WL 6235607, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 2013).
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting Henry v. Lucky Strike Entertainment, LLC, No. 10-CV-03682(RRM)(MDG),
2013 WL 4710488, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2013)).
184. Id. (quoting Joseph v. N.Y. Yankees P’Ship, No. 00 Civ. 2275(SHS), 2000 WL 1559019, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2000)).
185. Id. at *7.
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discriminated against plaintiff since the events in question, much less
allegations that such discrimination likely will occur in the future.”186 The
court had already struck down the Title II claim because plaintiff only sought
monetary damages, but even if she had sought the injunctive relief allowed by
the statute, the lack of evidence that future harm was “real and imminent”
would still ultimately defeat her claim.187
Furthermore, the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint did not establish a
plausible claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (Title II), according to the court.188 To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that he or she:
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise the
right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public
accommodation; (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment; and
(4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated persons who are
not members of the protected class.189
The third and fourth prongs of the test have proven particularly
troublesome to plaintiffs with consumer discrimination claims. Acey v. Bob
Evans Farms, Inc. provides an example.190 Visiting a restaurant with his
daughter, plaintiff Joel Acey asked a waitress to be seated near the front of the
restaurant, “which was not busy and where space was available.”191 Rather
than oblige his request, the waitress took Acey to the back of the restaurant
where she slammed the menus on the table, calling Acey a “damned idiot.”192
The court rejected Acey’s Title II claim based on the third and fourth
prongs of the prima facie test.193 Despite the hostile treatment, Acey failed to
satisfy the third prong as he did not demonstrate that he was denied the full
enjoyment or benefits of a place of public accommodation.194 As to the fourth
prong, the court noted that his complaint was “devoid of any allegations” that

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Taylor v. Ahold, No. 3:16cv241, 2017 WL 377935, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2017).
No. 2:13-cv-04916, 2014 WL 989201, at *4 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 13, 2014).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
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non-members of a protected class were treated more favorably.195
Recognizing the difficulty of having to identify different treatment of
similarly situated people outside of one’s protected class, some courts have
applied an altered version of the fourth prong.196 Typically used in cases
involving restaurants where plaintiffs often have difficulty demonstrating
disparate treatment, the modified test asks whether “(a) the services were
made available to similarly situated persons outside the plaintiff’s protected
class or (b) the plaintiff ‘received services in a markedly hostile manner and
in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively
discriminatory.’”197
Even the modified standard of the fourth prong presents difficulty for
plaintiffs. For example, in Hynes v. Brasil, plaintiff brought suit following an
argument with a restaurant manager who asked him to move to a smaller
table.198 During the encounter, the manager explained that he wished to make
the larger tables available for the lunch rush.199 Hynes pointed out a woman
sitting by herself at a large table, but the manager told him that she had been
with a party of four that had ordered food.200 Therefore, the court concluded
that “Hynes does not point to or submit any evidence showing that other
similarly situated persons . . . outside his protected class were treated more
favorably.”201
The manager repeatedly invited Hynes to order, but Hynes just replied,
“possibly coffee.”202 The manager responded that he “did not ‘appreciate that
kind of business here.’”203 Analyzing Hynes’ claim under the modified test,
the court held that the manager’s actions did not meet the “markedly hostile”
standard because invitations to order and explanations for asking a patron to
move to a smaller table did not qualify as hostile.204 While the manager’s
behavior may have eventually risen to such a level, it still did not qualify as it

195. Id.
196. Hynes v. Brasil LLC, No. H-17-2419, 2018 WL 1726157, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2018)
(citing Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs. Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 350, n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *4.
202. Id. at *1.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *4.
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did not occur until after Hynes had become hostile himself.205
2. State Public Accommodations Laws
The state public accommodations laws vary in their specificity in terms
of enumerating what they define as places of public accommodations. Many
provide exhaustive lists,206 while others offer little more than generalized
statements.207 The state of Wyoming provides a very broad definition of what
constitutes a place of public accommodation, with its statute simply referring
to places that are “public in nature, or which invite the patronage of the
public.”208
Transportation providers are mentioned frequently in lists of covered
entities. Alaska’s and Montana’s statutes each refer to “transportation
companies.”209 The statutes of Hawaii and Michigan specify transportation
facilities “of any kind.”210
Massachusetts mentions “carrier[s]” for
transportation as well as any facilities belonging to them.211
Lodging facilities are included in the statutes, often listed in the form of
hotels, inns, and motels.212 Some states employ a broader definition,213 while
allowing certain lodgings to be exempted from non-discrimination statutes.214
Under most state laws (as well as federal law), an establishment qualifies for
the “Mrs. Murphy exemption” if it is located within a building “which
contains not more than five (5) rooms for rent and which is actually occupied

205. Id.
206. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601
(West 2014); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02 (West 2020).
207. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46A-63 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5902 (West
2005); IND. CODE ANN. 22-9-1-3 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2 (West 2019).
208. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-9-101 (West 2020); see also NCSL, supra note 162 (listing no
definitional statute for public accommodations in Wyoming).
209. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300 (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 (West 2015).
210. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 489-2 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 37.2301 (West 2000).
211. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 2016).
212. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300 (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4502 (West
2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.010 (West 2017).
213. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2014) (“‘[P]lace of public
accommodation’ means . . . any place to eat, drink, sleep, or rest.”) (emphasis added); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 489-2 (West 2019).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (1964); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (West 2017); 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-101 (West 2018).
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by the proprietor of such establishment as a residence.”215
State courts tend to interpret their own public accommodations laws
broadly. For example, in King v. Greyhound Lines,216 the reviewing court
held that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination under Oregon’s state
public accommodations law despite not being refused service.217 In King, the
plaintiff brought suit after being subjected to racial epithets while trying to
refund a one-way bus ticket.218 The defendant alleged that racial slurs were
not actionable under the act, and the trial court agreed.219
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision.220 It
interpreted the state statute broadly, stating that the prohibition against
“distinction, discrimination, or restriction” on the basis of race encompasses
more than an outright denial of service.221 Despite the lack of legislative
history and case law on the issue, the court noted the general intent behind the
legislation to prevent “operators and owners of businesses catering to the
general public from subjecting Negroes to oppression and humiliation.”222
A few courts have considered whether an online business qualifies as a
place of public accommodation. Recently, California’s Supreme Court held
that the state’s public accommodation law “applies to online businesses and
that visiting a website with intent to use its services is, for purposes of
standing, equivalent to presenting oneself for services at a brick-and-mortar
store.”223 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit agreed with the lower court that a place of public accommodation must
be a physical location.224
215. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7)(A).
216. 656 P.2d 349 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
217. Id. at 352.
218. Id. at 350.
219. Id. at 352. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant while sitting without a jury. Id.
220. Id. at 352.
221. Id. at 351.
222. Id. at 352.
223. White v. Square, Inc., 446 P.3d 276, 277–78 (Cal. 2019). Plaintiff sued the online platform
alleging that he was prevented from using its services on the basis of his occupation. Id. at 278. Like
the high court in California, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Court of Appeals of
New York have held that places of public accommodation do not require a physical structure to qualify
as a place of public accommodation. See Currier v. Nat’l. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 965 N.E.2d 829,
842–43 (Mass. 2012); see also U.S. Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d
1199, 1203 (N.Y. 1983). A federal district court in New York has held that a website is a place of
public accommodation. Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, 268 F.Supp.3d 381, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
224. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 816 Fed. App’x. 497, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Similarly,
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Another important point in interpreting state public accommodation laws
lies in deciding who is protected from discriminatory acts by providers.225
Jackson v. Superior Court featured a plaintiff who brought a claim for
discrimination after a bank teller prevented him from giving investment
advice to two bank customers.226 Jackson was not himself a customer of the
bank.227 Ruling in Jackson’s favor, the California Court of Appeal looked
beyond the statutory language and determined that the legislative intent
behind the law was to cover more than just “selling, buying or trading.”228 In
accompanying customers to assist them with their banking business, Jackson
was engaging in a protected act under the statute, the denial of which
prevented him from experiencing the “‘full and equal accommodations,
advantages, privileges or services’ of the bank.”229
Another California Court of Appeal case, Payne v. Anaheim Memorial
Medical Center, Inc., is instructive on the matter of who is protected under
the state’s public accommodations law.230 Plaintiff, Dr. David Payne, alleged
racial discrimination against a hospital after suffering adverse treatment by
colleagues that hindered his treatment of a patient.231 The hospital argued that
it was exempt from the civil rights law as Dr. Payne was not an employee.232

the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that “a ‘location’ in cyberspace,
such as NABI’s website, is not a ‘place’ of public accommodation” under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (NJLAD). Demetro v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bunco Investigations, Civ. No. 146521(KM)(SCM), 2019 WL 2612687, at *15 (D.N.J. June 25, 2019). The court’s holding rests on its
characterization of NABI as an organization that restricts its membership. See id. Therefore,
it seems likely that if the court was considering a different type of website, like an online
retailer of consumer goods or services, it might more readily see similarities with the
NJLAD’s enumerated examples such as “any . . . retail shop, store, establishment or
concession dealing with goods and services of any kind.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5. David Brody & Sean Bickford, Discriminatory Denial of Service: Applying
State Public Accommodations Laws to Online Commerce, LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
UNDER LAW 1, 24 (2020), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Online-PublicAccommodations-Report.pdf.
225. See, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also
James M. Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961, 967–68 (2019).
226. Jackson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207–08.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 209.
229. See id.
230. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
231. Id. at 232–33.
232. Id. at 244.
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Instead, the hospital said Dr. Payne’s access to the hospital’s facilities arose
out of his membership in what could have been considered “an elite club”
because the facilities were not offered to the entire public.233 The hospital
argued that Dr. Payne’s access was contingent upon his “elite” status as a
physician.234 Ruling for Dr. Payne, the court held that the Unruh Civil Rights
Act (UCRA) “is not restricted to those businesses or public facilities which
offer their wares or services to everyone.”235 Given the qualifications
necessary to become one, it was reasonable for the hospital to restrict staff
privileges only to physicians.236 However, it could not go a step further and
restrict the group to members of a certain race.237
Wayne v. MasterShield, Inc. features a contrasting view to that in the
Payne case on the issue of the relationships between discrimination victims
and providers.238 Samuel Sando Wayne brought suit under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA) after he was detained and harassed by security
staff at Parkview, a residential apartment complex where he was staying as a
guest.239 Like the hospital in Payne, Parkview was selective with respect to
its tenants and guests.240 The Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the
restriction to members of the general public, along with a limited tenant
capacity and requirement that tenants “sponsor” their visitors, qualified it as a
private facility and not a place of public accommodation.241
In interpreting the MHRA, the court gave “strong weight” to federal
precedent because of “substantial similarities” between it and Title II.242 The
court took a narrow view, noting that Title II limited its definition of
accommodations to an “establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests” and that apartment complexes provide “private non-transient
dwellings.”243 Therefore, the court found that Mr. Wayne’s public
accommodations claim was rightfully dismissed on summary judgment.244
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
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Id.
Id. at 245.
See id.
Id.
597 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 919.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921–22.
Id. at 922.
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The state court made a similar distinction in Parsons v. Henry, an Oregon
case, to exclude a private construction contractor from the definition of place
of public accommodation based on his performance of services only after a
bid process and negotiation.245
State laws did not fare any better or worse in federal courts than they did
in their respective states, meeting the same fate as their federal counterparts.
When federal claims were either absent or evaluated independently of the state
claims, federal courts tended to defer to the state courts.246 In Harrington v.
Airbnb, Inc., for example, the federal district court noted the Oregon Supreme
Court’s broad interpretation of the Oregon Public Accommodations Act in
holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Airbnb was a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the statute.247 Where the state court
interprets the public accommodations statute broadly, federal courts are likely
to adopt a similar interpretation.248
In Craig v. US Bancorp, the plaintiff alleged discrimination after
withstanding over an hour’s worth of delays in trying to cash a check.249 The
defendant stated that the delays were due to a “‘fraud’ investigation” on the
account at issue, but two White test customers were able to cash checks on the
account without any problem.250 Examining Oregon’s public accommodation
statute, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon noted the
state appellate court’s interpretation that the “chief harm” of discrimination
was the “greater evil of unequal treatment.”251 Applying this interpretation,
the district court held that “the issue [was] not whether racial invective was
used,” but whether Craig suffered unequal treatment on account of his race.252
In this case, the court found that Craig suffered unequal treatment when he
faced the delay in service that caused him emotional harm.253

245. 672 P.2d 717, 721 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
246. See, e.g., Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (D. Or. 2018); Craig v. US
Bancorp, No. Civ. 03-1680-AA, 2004 WL 817149, at *2, *4 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2004).
247. Harrington, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 1093.
248. See id.
249. Craig, 2004 WL 817149, at *1.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *4 (quoting King v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 656 P.2d 349, 352 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)).
252. Id.
253. Id.
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B. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ensures the right of “[a]ll
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . to make and enforce
contracts.”254 The statute defines making and enforcing contracts as including
“the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.”255 It has been employed by plaintiffs claiming discrimination
in consumer transactions, although it is relied upon primarily in cases of
employment discrimination.256
Because it neither limits the types of establishments covered under the
statute nor does it restrict plaintiffs from seeking damages, § 1981 is a more
effective tool for consumer discrimination plaintiffs.257 The courts have
adopted the burden-shifting framework for plaintiffs suing under § 1981.258
The framework was first adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, an employment-discrimination case, to guide the
analysis for claims relying on circumstantial evidence.259 The test was
adapted to the consumer setting by the court in Callwood v. Dave & Busters,
Inc.260 Under the Callwood test, to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that:
1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they made themselves
available to receive and pay for services ordinarily provided by the
defendant to all members of the public in the manner in which they
are ordinarily provided; and (3) they did not enjoy the privileges and
benefits of the contracted for experience under factual circumstances
which rationally support an inference of unlawful discrimination in
that (a) they are deprived of services while similarly situated persons

254. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West).
255. Id.
256. See Delaney M. Busch, Supreme Court Clarifies Race Discrimination Claims Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 Must Meet More Stringent “But-For” Causation Standard, MINTZ (Apr. 17, 2020)
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2226/2020-04-17-supreme-court-clarifies-racediscrimination-claims-under.
257. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West). See Abby Morrow Richardson, Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to
Claims of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 119, 121 (2005).
258. See, e.g., Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2001).
259. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
260. 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (D. Md. 2000).
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outside the protected class were not deprived of those services, and/or
(b) they received services in a markedly hostile manner and in a
manner which a reasonable person would find objectively
unreasonable.261
A plaintiff must attempt to show that she made herself available to receive
and pay for services.262 But at what point does the contractual relationship
begin? Courts that have considered this question have determined that a
customer’s mere presence in a business establishment is insufficient to allege
that a contractual relationship exists between the customer and the business.263
A “tangible attempt to contract” must be made.264 In Henderson v. Office
Depot, Inc., for example, the District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana held that a contractual relationship began the moment a customer
attempted to negotiate the terms of a prospective transaction.265 Henderson’s
claim for discrimination arose when the defendant store’s employees failed to
assist the plaintiff in purchasing a printer.266 The court cited a broad standard
put forth by the U.S. Supreme Court “expressly stat[ing] that § 1981 reaches
‘all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship.’”267
Newman v. Borders, Inc. involved a plaintiff who was visiting a Borders
bookstore intending to purchase a children’s book for his nephew.268 As he
proceeded to the register, he was confronted by a security officer and accused
of putting items in a shopping bag (from another store) that he was carrying.269
After emptying the bag and proving he had not stolen from the store, Newman
was denied the opportunity to view security camera footage that allegedly
showed him putting items in the bag and ultimately left the store without
making a purchase.270 According to the court, because he was attempting to
make a transaction by purchasing a book, it was sufficient that Newman
alleged he was “thwarted in his attempt to make a purchase and close a

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Newman v. Borders, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 346, 349 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2907, 2016 WL 6653029, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3 (citing Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1994)).
Newman, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
Id.
Id. at 348.
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contract.”271
Despite the broad Rivers standard, the protections given to “all phases”
of the contractual relationship do not necessarily extend beyond the
completion of the transaction itself.272 Range v. Wal-Mart Supercenter is one
example where the plaintiffs presented “adequate” evidence from which to
infer discrimination based on race.273 The incident in Range stemmed from
security personnel demanding that plaintiffs show a receipt after making their
purchase.274 Because the discriminatory action took place after the purchase,
the district court held that “the alleged discrimination was not part of the
‘contract’ or sale, and [could not] be the basis for liability under § 1981.”275
Similarly, in Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., after making a
purchase, Carl Youngblood was confronted by a store security officer.276
Youngblood’s argument focused on this distinction: the officer took the
purchased items and did not return them to him; therefore, the transaction had
not ended.277 The appeals court held that the distinction was of “little
significance.”278 The “key” question was whether a contractual duty remained
when Youngblood was confronted by security.279 The court answered in the
negative, holding that the transaction ended once Youngblood paid and
received the beef jerky he purchased.280 “[N]either party owed the other any
duty under the retail-sale contract.”281
Plaintiffs bringing claims under § 1981 must demonstrate more than a
“possible loss of . . . contracting opportunities.”282 The possible loss of future
opportunities is insufficient.283 In Hynes, the alleged discriminatory treatment
by Fergus, in the eyes of the court, “did not interfere with Hynes’ patronage

271. Id. at 349.
272. See, e.g., Range v. Wal-Mart Supercenter, No. 3:08 CV 09, 2008 WL 1701870, at *4 (N.D.
Ind. Apr. 8, 2008); see also note 267 and accompanying text (citing to Rivers).
273. Range, 2008 WL 1701870, at *4.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. 266 F.3d 851, 853 (8th Cir. 2001).
277. Id. at 854.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. McCrea v. Saks, Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-CV-1936, 2000 WL 1912726, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22,
2000).
283. Id.
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of the restaurant.”284 Although the hostile treatment was the cause of Hynes’
decision to leave the cafe, it did not per se interfere with his ability to make a
transaction protected by § 1981.285
Likewise, in McCrea v. Saks, Inc., the plaintiff and her daughter left the
defendant’s retail store after their confrontation with the store’s security
personnel.286 As previously mentioned, they did so after a salesman asked
security to “get this ‘n-----’ out.”287 In dismissing McCrea’s complaint, the
district court did not credit her contention that the defendant knew she wanted
to purchase a shirt and concluded that she failed to demonstrate that she would
have tried to purchase merchandise had she not been harassed by the
defendant.288
Prong 3(a) parallels the “similarly situated” test previously discussed
relative to the Title II analysis.289 It is based on “the understanding that ‘the
comparison will never involve precisely the same set of . . . [conduct]
occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of
circumstances.’”290
In cases involving adequate comparative evidence, courts may choose not
to follow the Callwood test; as was the case in Williams v. Staples Inc.291 The
plaintiff in Williams suspected he was discriminated against when he was not
able to cash an out-of-state check at a Staples store, but his friend, a White
woman, told him that her out-of-state check was accepted during a prior
visit.292 Two testers, one White and one Black, were sent by a civil rights
agency to the store.293 The White tester’s out-of-state check was accepted for
payment while the Black tester’s check was not.294 The court concluded that
the results of the tests, as well as the experiences of the plaintiff and his friend,
were sufficient evidence to allow the plaintiff to state a prima facie case of
284. Hynes v. Brasil LLC, Civil Action No. H-17-2419, 2018 WL 1726157, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
10, 2018).
285. See id.
286. McCrea, 2000 WL 1912726, at *1.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *3.
289. See supra text accompanying note 197.
290. Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Callwood v.
Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (D. Md. 2000)).
291. 372 F.3d 662, 668 n.5 (4th Cir. 2004).
292. Id. at 665–66.
293. Id. at 666.
294. Id.
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racial discrimination.295
Prong 3(b) of the Callwood test serves as an alternative to 3(a),
“account[ing] for situations in the commercial establishment context in which
a plaintiff cannot [readily] identify other similarly situated persons.”296 The
“markedly hostile” prong allows a fact finder to infer “‘discrimination
sufficient to support a prima facie case’ without” the plaintiff having to prove
differential treatment of similarly situated individuals.297 Factors used in the
determination of markedly hostile conduct include behavior that “is (1) so
profoundly contrary to the manifest financial interests of the merchant and/or
her employees; (2) so far outside of widely-accepted business norms; and (3)
so arbitrary on its face, that the conduct supports a rational inference of
discrimination.”298
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the test and found that
Wal-Mart engaged in “markedly hostile” behavior toward Ms. Christian.299
The plaintiff was an African American woman shopping with her White friend
at Wal-Mart.300 She was excessively offered assistance by an employee before
being accused of shoplifting and having the police called on her.301
Considering the evidence that plaintiff and her friend were the only two
shoppers in the department, and that only plaintiff was using a shopping
cart,302 the court held that Christian “raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether she received services in a markedly hostile manner.”303
Bonner v. S-Fer International, Inc. is another case in which there was
“scant” evidence of differential treatment between a plaintiff and members of
a non-protected class.304 Examining clothes at defendant’s boutique, plaintiff
Tasha Bonner was treated rudely by employees before being told to leave.305

295. Id. at 668 n.5.
296. Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Callwood v.
Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 708 (D. Md. 2000)).
297. See id.
298. Id. (quoting Callwood, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 708).
299. See id. at 872, 879.
300. Id. at 864–65.
301. Id. at 865.
302. Id. at 878 (“The only factual difference between these two shoppers, i.e., that Christian had a
shopping cart, reinforces the inference of discrimination, because a customer with a cart presumably
appears more serious about shopping than a patron who walks around without a cart.”).
303. Id.
304. 207 F. Supp. 3d 19, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2016).
305. Id. at 22.
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She was given conflicting explanations for the demand to leave the store, first
being told she lacked a membership to shop there, but then later being told it
was because of her “attitude.”306 An employee called the police while another
locked the door, leaving Bonner “‘trapped’ in the store for ‘several minutes’
before she was permitted to leave.”307
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia noted that
plaintiffs in retail discrimination cases “often arise from limited, one-off
interactions with service-industry establishments.”308 Bonner may have been
the only customer in the store at the time of her encounter.309 Not being able
to compare herself to White customers “should not require dismissing a claim
that otherwise rests on facts supporting a plausible inference of racial
discrimination.”310 Therefore, the court concluded that the store personnel’s
behavior could be viewed as “markedly hostile” and denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim.311
The treatment of § 1981 claims has varied among states.312 In Turner v.
Wong, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, employed a
broad construction of § 1981.313 Comparing it to New Jersey’s public
accommodations law, the court deemed § 1981 to be “similarly expansive,”
reaching “purely private” discriminatory acts.314 The court also held § 1981
to cover discrimination occurring “both during and after the formation of a
contract.”315 This was a crucial holding for the plaintiff, Delois Turner, as she
experienced discrimination during and after her purchase of a donut and
coffee from defendant’s store.316 When Turner complained about her donut
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 25.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See Kendall Coffey, Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. 1981: Keeping a Compromised Promise of Equality
to Blacks, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 318, 325–26 (1977) (laying out the varying treatments of the statute and
explaining how the lower courts and the Supreme Court deal with the vague nature of the statute); see
also Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two: A Survey of Federal and State AntiDiscrimination Public Accommodation Laws, 2 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 288, 230 (2011) (finding that
the outcome of a case will vary depending on which state the action is brought in, as evidenced by
differing state public accommodation statutes).
313. 832 A.2d. 240, 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 345–46.
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being stale and asked for a new one, the defendant uttered racial epithets and
ordered her to leave the store.317 Because she was not able to complete her
original transaction, the court allowed the plaintiff to overcome the summary
judgment that was entered against her at the trial level.318
In contrast, the court in Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc. granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff was able to complete his
purchases after an African American cashier refused to help him and diverted
him to a different cashier based on his race.319 Although the appellate court
affirmed the district court’s decision, it did not address whether § 1981 applies
after the formation of a contract.320 Instead, it highlighted Lopez’s failure to
present evidence of discriminatory intent.
The analysis used by courts in evaluating state public accommodations
claims was identical to the methods used for § 1981 claims, tying their fate
together.321 The results of the assessment conducted in this part suggest that
state public accommodations laws and § 1981 are more effective than Title II
in providing relief for victims of consumer discrimination. In Part III, we
deepen our analysis by tracking the outcomes of cases in which courts ruled
on defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.
III. PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATES IN SURVIVING MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Our research uncovered only eight cases in which consumers alleging
discrimination based on race have advanced to the trial stage.322 All of them
involved § 1981 claims. As shown in Figure 1, three trials resulted in findings
for the plaintiffs, one of which was reversed on appeal.323 All of the trials that

317. Id. at 346.
318. Id. at 355–56, 359–60.
319. No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0104, 2014 WL 354252, *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014).
320. Id. at *1, *3.
321. See, e.g., Bonner v. S-Fer Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 19, 24 (D.D.C. 2016); Drayton v. Toys
“R” Us Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 149, 157–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
322. See infra fig.1.
323. Wong v. Mangone, 450 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 813 (2012) (jury
verdict for plaintiff affirmed on appeal); Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008)
(bench trial verdict for plaintiff reversed on appeal for defendant); Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores,
Inc., 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001) (jury verdict for plaintiff; defendant’s judgment as a matter of
law was denied by trial court and the denial was affirmed on appeal).
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resulted in victories for the defendants were affirmed on appeal.324
FIGURE 1 | FEDERAL APPEALS COURT DECISIONS REVIEWING JURY AND
BENCH TRIALS (§ 1981 CLAIMS)
100.0%

100.0%

90.0%

Trial court finding for
Plaintiff (N=3 cases)

80.0%
70.0%

66.7%

60.0%

Trial court finding for
Defendant (N=5 cases)

50.0%
40.0%

33.3%

30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Affirmed on appeal

Reversed on appeal

Indeed, most cases end long before a trial takes place.325 In this Part, we
analyze state and federal court decisions to determine whether plaintiffs are
more successful at defeating defendants’ motions to dismiss or motions for
summary judgment.

324. Aboeid v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 566 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2014) (bench trial verdict
for defendant affirmed on appeal); Bary v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 553 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2014) (bench
trial verdict for defendant affirmed on appeal); Odunukwe v. Bank of Am., 335 F. App’x 58 (1st Cir.
2009) (jury verdict for defendant affirmed on appeal); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138 (9th
Cir. 2006) (jury verdict for defendant affirmed on appeal); Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., No. CIV.A.
397CV0638-H, 2001 WL 1442340 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2001), aff’d, 330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003),
reh’g en banc denied, 71 F. App’x 443(5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (jury verdict
for plaintiff overturned by judgment as a matter of law for defendant; affirmed on appeal).
325. Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitation of Federal Civil Rights
Protection, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 275, 330 (2001) (noting how courts narrowly construe § 1981, resulting in
the dismissal of many consumer discrimination cases).
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A. In State Court
1. Motions to Dismiss
A total of nine decisions from state courts involving motions to dismiss
were studied.326 Of those, only one was decided in favor of the plaintiff at the
trial court level,327 with the remaining eight cases finding for the defendant.328
Figure 2 shows that half of the dismissals were affirmed and approximately
one-third (37.5%) were reversed.
FIGURE 2 | STATE COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
100.0%
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Trial court finding for
Plaintiff (N=1 case)

90.0%
80.0%

Trial court finding for
Defendant (N=8 cases)
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50.0%

50.0%
37.5%

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%

12.5%

10.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

No appeal

Affirmed on appeal

Reversed on appeal

326. See infra note 322.
327. Chestnut Hill Coll. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 158 A.3d 251 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2017).
328. Winchell v. English, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1976) (reversed trial court); Reed v.
Hollywood Pro. Sch., 338 P.2d 633 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1959) (affirmed trial court); Coleman
v. Middlestaff, 305 P.2d 1020 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1957) (affirmed trial court); Lambert v.
Mandel’s of Cal., 319 P.2d 469 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1957) (reversed trial court); McGill v. 830
S. Mich. Hotel, 216 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (reversed trial court); Kiray v. Hyvee, Inc., 716
N.W.2d 193 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006) (affirmed trial court); Lopez v. Howth, Inc., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 386
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002), aff’d, 806 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (affirmed trial court); Phila.
Elec. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 290 A.2d 699 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1972) (at trial level,
reversed interlocutory order of Human Relations Commission that favored plaintiff).
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When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the
factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.329 In each case where the plaintiff defeated
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court employed a broad reading of the
statute at hand.
In Chestnut Hill College v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
the court held that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act does not absolutely
exclude Catholic colleges and universities from its coverage.330 Defendant
was a Catholic college accused of unfairly expelling an African American
student.331 The court held that the college failed to cite any authority to
establish it was equivalent to private, parochial primary and secondary
schools.332 The court decided that it would have been premature to grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss at this stage as the record remained
significantly undeveloped.333
Some courts have considered the function of the place alleged to be a
public accommodation and analogized it to those specifically enumerated by
the statute. In Lambert v. Mandel’s of California, the location at issue was a
retail shoe store.334 While not specifically enumerated by section 51 of the
California Civil Code, the court held it to be similar in function to those that
were because it was “open to the public generally for the purchase of
goods.”335 Accordingly, it too was deemed to be a place of public
accommodation and covered by the statute.336
Two courts relied on legislative intent in rejecting defendants’ motions to
dismiss White plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination based on their association
with Blacks. The courts in McGill v. 830 S. Michigan Hotel337 and Winchell
v. English338 both pointed to the intent of the legislature to support a favorable
interpretation for the plaintiffs.339 In McGill, the Appellate Court of Illinois

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Lopez, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. at 386.
158 A.3d at 260–61.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
319 P.2d 469 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1957).
Id. at 470.
Id.
216 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1976).
Winchell, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 21; McGill, 216 N.E.2d at 277.
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cited the “obvious intention” of the legislature in extending the scope of the
Illinois Civil Rights Act, a penal statute, to cover the instance at issue where
the White plaintiff received discriminatory rent increases due to her having
African American guests.340 In Winchell, the Court of Appeals cited the
“legislative purpose” of California Code section 51 to cover the plaintiffs,
White individuals who were discriminated against on account of their
association with African Americans.341 Citing McGill, the Winchell court also
broadly construed the “whoever makes any discrimination . . . on account of
. . . color” language of section 51 to extend to discrimination based on
association with individuals of color.342
In contrast, a trial court case, Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission, is particularly notable for the narrow reading
of the state statute employed by the court.343 In granting defendant’s motion
to dismiss, it construed an electrical company’s offices to be places of public
accommodation, but not the locations at which the services were received.344
The plaintiffs in the case were Black customers who alleged discriminatory
practices, such as stringent rules relating to security deposits and quicker
termination of services for delinquencies that did not as easily result in
termination in non-minority communities.345 The court held that the
plaintiffs’ neighborhoods could not be considered places of public
accommodation as they were not “physical location[s] to which the general
public is invited to do business.”346 In the court’s view, ruling for plaintiffs
would have had serious policy implications because the state human rights
commission would have jurisdiction over virtually any business transaction in
the state.347
Like the trial level cases, victories for defendants at the appellate level
rested on the narrow construction of the statute at issue. Kiray v. Hyvee, Inc.
presented an instance where the plaintiff brought suit after being suspected of
theft and searched by the defendant’s employees upon setting off the security

340. McGill, 216 N.E.2d at 277.
341. Winchell, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 21–22. The White plaintiffs alleged discrimination by defendant
mobile home park owners for subleasing their space to Black tenants. Id. at 21.
342. Id. at 21.
343. 290 A.2d 699 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
344. Id. at 703.
345. Id. at 700.
346. Id. at 703.
347. Id.
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system as she was leaving.348 The Iowa Court of Appeals dismissed her claim
for failing to prove the similarly-situated prong of the McDonnell Douglas
framework for proving discrimination.349 Even taking into account the more
lenient Callwood test, which allows for the establishment of a prima facie case
in the absence of a similarly-situated comparator, the plaintiff’s claim failed
as she could not prove the defendant’s actions were markedly hostile.350 The
court characterized her allegations of the defendant’s employees referencing
her race as vague and insufficient.351
2. Motions for Summary Judgment
We examined a total of seventeen state court cases that were decided at
the summary judgment stage.352 As with motions to dismiss, the results were
much more favorable to defendants, as can be seen in the chart below. In fact,
Figure 3 shows that only three plaintiffs survived the motion at the trial level
and one of them was reversed on appeal.353 Plaintiffs fared a bit better on
appeal, where one-third of the trial court decisions granting defendants’
motions for summary judgment were reversed.354 The state and federal law
claims are counted separately in the three cases where both claims were
brought, because the state appeals courts affirmed the trial court decisions on

348. 716 N.W.2d 193, 195–96 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006).
349. Id. at 204.
350. Id. at 205.
351. See id.
352. See infra fig.3.
353. Rice v. Sioux City Mem’l Park Cemetery, 60 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953) (Supreme Court
vacated opinion on appeal); Webster v. TJX Cos., 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 476 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005) (trial
level; no subsequent history); Hudgins v. Higginbotham, 82 Va. Cir. 152 (2011) (trial level; no
subsequent history).
354. Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0104, 2014 WL 354252 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan.
30, 2014) (affirmed trial court); Colquitt v. Homer Mem’l Hosp., 771 So. 2d 818 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(affirmed trial court); McKnight v. Don Massey Cadillac, Inc., No. 218952, 2001 WL 721384 (Mich.
Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2001) (affirmed trial court); Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982) (reversed trial court); Kor v. Mall of Am. Cos., No. C4-99-1701, 2000 Minn. App.
LEXIS 433 (Ct. App. May 9, 2000) (affirmed trial court); Wayne v. MasterShield, Inc., 597 N.W.2d
917 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (affirmed trial court); Davis v. Torres, No. L-5972-08, 2012 WL 1033287
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2012) (affirmed trial court); Turner v. Wong, 832 A.2d 340 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (reversed trial court); Oklahoma Human Rights Comm’n v. Hotie, Inc.,
505 P.2d 1320 (Okla. 1973) (reversed trial court); Parsons v. Henry, 672 P.2d 717 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(affirmed trial court); Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. L07, 974 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. 1998)
(affirmed trial court).
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the federal claims but reversed them on the state law claims.355
FIGURE 3 | STATE COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Summary judgment is properly granted where, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the record indicates that
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.”356
In three cases, the court found that a defendant’s establishment was not a
place of public accommodation. As did the court in Philadelphia Electric
discussed above, the court in Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C. based its
decision on a narrow reading of Title II to confine discrimination in public
accommodations to that which occurs “on the premises” of the establishment,

355. Clarke v. Kmart Corp., 495 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (affirmed trial court on
plaintiff’s federal public accommodations law claim; reversed trial court on state civil rights act claim);
Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirmed trial court on
federal claim (TITLE II); reversed on state law claim); Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (affirmed trial court on federal § 1981 claim; reversed on state law claim).
356. Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 481 S.E.2d 14, 20 (N.C. 1997) (citing N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule
56(c) (1990)).
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and not elsewhere, such as the homes of the customers which the
establishment serves.357 It affirmed Domino’s motion for summary judgment
on the Title II claim, but reversed the lower court’s grant for summary
judgment on plaintiff’s Tennessee Human Rights Act claim.358 Citing
legislative intent to prohibit discrimination, the court held that Domino’s was
a place of public accommodation under the state law by virtue of its being “an
establishment which supplies goods and services to the general public.”359
Plaintiffs’ failure to prove discriminatory intent allowed defendants to
prevail at the summary judgment stage. Allegations of poor service, or a
refusal of service, are deemed insufficient in the absence of evidence of
specific racial animus.360 Even the phrase “you people” is inadequate
evidence for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment if there is
no overt reference to race.361 Moreover, a claim that defendant overtly
referred to her race may still fail when plaintiff brought suit against an
employer of the persons who uttered the racial slurs.362
Overt references to Harold and Shirley Ledsinger’s race enabled their
claim to survive summary judgment when they were uttered as Harold was
being kicked out of an auto parts store.363 The plaintiffs brought suit after
Harold was subjected to racial epithets while trying to complete a purchase at
the defendant’s establishment.364 The suit was dismissed through summary
judgment at the trial level.365 However, the Michigan Court of Appeals
357. 124 S.W.3d at 529. The case consisted of ninety-two plaintiffs who sued Domino’s for not
delivering food to African American customers in a neighborhood of Memphis. Id. at 531.
358. Id. at 536–37, 539.
359. Id. at 539.
360. See Lopez v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0104, 2014 WL 354252, at *4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 2014) (unreported); McKnight v. Don Massey Cadillac, Inc., No. 218952, 2001 WL
721384, at *3, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2001) (unreported); Colquitt v. Homer Mem’l Hosp., 771
So. 2d 818, 820 (App. Ct. La. 2000).
361. See McKnight, 2001 WL 721384 at *4.
362. See Davis v. Torres, No. A-1951-10T4, 2012 WL 1033287, at *4–5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Mar. 29, 2012) (unreported).
363. Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); see also Turner v.
Wong, 832 A.2d 340, 255–56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (demonstrating the state court’s
treatment of summary judgment motion in a discrimination case where a store customer left before
completing the desired transaction after being called a racial slur).
364. Ledsinger, 318 N.W.2d at 560 (“It is alleged that in front of and within the hearing of third
parties, defendant called Harold Ledsinger a ‘n-----’ and told him that he should get his ‘black ass’ out
of the store. In addition, it is alleged that defendant stated that he ‘did not want or need n----business.’”).
365. Id. at 560.
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reversed summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim made under the state’s ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act.366 The key factor in the court’s reversal was the
presence of overt racial epithets, leading to a reasonable inference that Harold
Ledsinger was denied service on account of his race.367
In another Michigan case, Clarke v. Kmart Corp., the plaintiff was able
to survive summary judgment because the Court of Appeals held that an
outright denial of access to goods and services was not required to establish a
violation of the state’s civil rights act.368
In the cases involving § 1981 claims, the stage at which the contested
transaction occurred was a factor that often led to a favorable result for
defendants. Courts granted summary judgment where the plaintiff had not yet
initiated the transaction, such as where the plaintiff was merely looking at
goods, or in situations where the transaction was already complete.369
B. In Federal Court
1. Motions to Dismiss
We analyzed seventeen federal appellate court decisions involving
motions to dismiss. At the trial court level, every decision resulted in a
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, fourteen of these decisions were
affirmed,370 and only three decisions were reversed in favor of plaintiff.371 The
three reversals involved § 1981 claims. The dismissals of plaintiffs’ Title II
claims were all affirmed on appeal.

366. Id. at 563, 565.
367. Id.
368. 495 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
369. See Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 20 P.3d 447, 457 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
370. Shin v. Am. Airline, Inc., 726 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2018) (mem.); Taylor v. Royal Ahold NV,
694 F. App’x 931 (4th Cir. 2017); Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir.
2017); Strober v. Payless Rental Car, 701 F. App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2017); Rodgers v. Curators of Univ.
of Mo. Sys., 634 F. App’x 598 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Hammond v. Kmart Corp., 733 F.3d 360
(5th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2012); Bishop v. Henry Modell &
Co., 422 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2011); Dunaway v. Cowboys Nightlife, Inc., 436 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir.
2011); Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009); Billelo v. Kum & Go, LLC, 374 F.3d
656 (8th Cir. 2004); Garret v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2002); Stearnes v. Baur’s Opera
House, Inc., 3 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1993); Bonner v. S-Fer Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2016).
371. El-Hallani v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 623 F. App’x 730 (6th Cir. 2015); Barfield v. Commerce
Bank, N.A., 484 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2007); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285
(5th Cir. 2004).
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FIGURE 4 | FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISMISS
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A common issue among the Title II cases was whether the plaintiff had
exhausted their administrative remedies before heading to court. Where a
state or local law prohibits the act or practice at issue, a suit pursuant to Title
II may not be brought before the expiration of thirty days after delivering
notice of the claim to the state or local authority.372 Courts tend to be strict in
their enforcement of this prerequisite. For example, in Strober v. Payless
Rental Car, dismissal was affirmed against a pro se plaintiff who failed to
exhaust her state remedies before filing suit in federal court.373
Another case from the Eighth Circuit, Billelo v. Kum & Go, L.L.C.,
involved a plaintiff who, in the words of the court, “apparently attempted to
comply with the procedural requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c).”374
Billelo filed a written notice complaining about a discriminatory practice to

372. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c) (2010).
373. 701 Fed. Appx. at 913 n.3 .
374. Billelo v. Kum & Go, LLC, 374 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2004).
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the Human Relations Director of the City of Omaha, Nebraska.375 The appeals
court nonetheless affirmed the dismissal based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.376 The court cited state law expressly declaring that
the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission administered public
accommodations laws.377 Accordingly, Billelo’s filing notice to the Omaha
Human Relations Director, while an attempt to comply with the requirements
of 2000a-3(c), was in error and fatal to his Title II claim.378
An important argument in defeating § 1981 claims involves the question
of a defendant’s interference with a plaintiff’s ability to contract. Garrett v.
Tandy is a case where the plaintiff was accused of the theft of a laptop after
he purchased goods at a RadioShack store.379 The manager who called the
police stated that all customers who were in the store during the same
timeframe as the plaintiff were suspected, but the court held this statement to
be “patently false.”380
Garrett advanced two theories as to why RadioShack was liable under
§ 1981, neither of which were persuasive to the court because he was able to
complete his purchase.381 The first theory was that being surveilled and
accompanied by employees the entire time he was in the store interfered with
his ability to make desired purchases.382 The court disagreed, noting that the
employees who accompanied Garrett were helpful and courteous; they
facilitated Garrett’s purchases rather than impeding them.383 The court also
noted that stores have legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for escorting
customers: to prevent shoplifting and vandalism of store property.384 Garrett’s
second theory was that the police deprived him of the enjoyment of his
purchases by intruding upon his household in search of the laptop.385 The
court found this contention to be a closer call, but nonetheless rejected it as
well.386 It held that Garrett’s transaction with RadioShack was complete by
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

106

Id.
Id. at 659, 661.
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 659.
295 F.3d 94, 96 (1st Cir. 2002).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101–02.
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the time he had returned home because it was consummated when he
successfully made his purchase while still at the store.387
Hammond v. Kmart Corp. involved a plaintiff who complained of
discriminatory behavior by a Kmart employee “while she was placing items
on hold in a layaway transaction.”388 After giving the clerk her ID, the clerk
insinuated that Hammond was a thief and referred to the ID as a “liquor ID.”389
The clerk further claimed that she used to live near plaintiff’s neighborhood,
but was forced to move due to incidents with “porch monkeys” in the area.390
Citing Garrett, the court affirmed the dismissal in favor of defendant, noting
that Hammond did not allege that the actual transaction itself was thwarted.391
Given that Hammond’s transaction involved making payments in
installments, she had multiple opportunities to show that she was impeded
from making payments, but failed to do so.392
As mentioned, the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims was reversed in only
three cases, two of which we describe here. Causey v. Sewell CadillacChevrolet Inc. involved a plaintiff who endured racial epithets and forcible
removal from a dealership after getting into an argument with employees who
refused to perform repairs on his vehicle.393 The district court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Causey could not prove he was
the victim of discriminatory service.394 The dealership claimed it wanted to
avoid working on Causey’s vehicle because the car was covered by the
warranty.395
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, finding that the use of direct
epithets by an employee of authority (the manager) and outright refusal of
service violated § 1981.396 In so holding, the court specifically pointed to the
“liberal pleading standard” put forth by the Supreme Court in which courts
must “view[] the complaint as a whole, rather than any one statement in

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 101.
733 F.3d 360, 361 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 364–65.
394 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 288.
Id. at 287–88.
Id. at 289–91.
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isolation.”397
In El-Hallani v. Huntington National Bank, two Arab American plaintiffs
brought suit after the defendant bank closed both of their bank accounts
without warning.398 An employee of the bank testified that the bank’s
quarterly lists of accounts to close “contained large numbers of accounts held
by people . . . of Middle Eastern descent.”399 The employee further testified
that the bank did not pressure employees to close similar accounts held by
people who were not of Middle Eastern descent.400
The trial court dismissed the case, holding that plaintiffs could only
demonstrate that discrimination was possible, not plausible, and that plaintiffs
failed to identify any similarly-situated members of a non-protected class who
were treated differently.401 The trial court premised the plausibility standard
on the precedent set forth by the Twombly and Iqbal cases.402 Under the
combined standard, a plaintiff is required “to have a greater knowledge . . . of
factual details in order to draft a ‘plausible complaint.’”403
Reversing the dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the trial court interpreted the Twombly and Iqbal standard too narrowly.404
Plaintiffs need only allege enough factual content to allow a court to draw a
reasonable inference of discrimination informed by “judicial experience and
common sense.”405 Although the plaintiffs did not put forth highly specific
evidence, it was sufficient to meet the low bar established under precedent
even without proving the different treatment of similarly-situated
individuals.406

397. Id. at 289.
398. 623 F. App’x 730, 731 (6th Cir. 2015).
399. Id. at 732.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 732–33.
402. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
403. El-Hallani v. Huntington Nat. Bank, No. 13-cv-12983, 2014 WL 988957, at *1, *5 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 13, 2014), rev’d 623 Fed. App’x 730 (6th Cir. 2015).
404. El-Hallani, 623 F. App’x at 739.
405. Id. at 734.
406. Id. at 739.
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2. Motions for Summary Judgment
Next, we examined the twenty-nine appellate decisions involving motions
for summary judgment, all of which initially favored the defendants. Of those,
almost two-thirds were affirmed on appeal (62.1%).
Again, plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims fared better than their Title II claims. Of
the twenty-two cases where § 1981 claims were brought, more than half
resulted in reversals in favor of the plaintiffs on appeal (54.5%).407 Figure 5
shows the breakdown of federal appellate court decisions involving § 1981
claims.

407. Menchu v. Legacy Health, 669 F. App’x 361 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirmed for defendant);
Dunaway v. Cowboys Nightlife, Inc., 436 F. App’x 386 (5th Cir. 2011) (reversed for plaintiff);
Withers v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 636 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirmed for defendant); Jones
v. J.C. Penney’s Dep’t Stores Inc., 317 Fed. App’x 71 (2nd Cir. 2009) (affirmed for defendant); Keck
v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversed for plaintiff); Green v. Dillard’s,
Inc., 483 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversed for plaintiff); Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., 490
F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirmed for defendant); Banks v. Bank of Am. N.A., 505 F. Supp. 2d 159
(D.D.C. 2007) (reversed for plaintiff); Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427 (4th Cir.
2006) (reversed for plaintiff); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversed for
plaintiff; remanded to trial where jury found for defendant on the § 1981 claim, which was then
affirmed on appeal); Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662 (4th Cir. 2004) (reversed for plaintiff);
Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversed for plaintiff); Lizardo v. Denny’s,
Inc., 270 F.3d 94 (2nd Cir. 2001) (affirmed for defendant); Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252
F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversed for plaintiff); Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d
851 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirmed for defendant); Singh v. Walmart Stores, 225 F.3d 650 (3d Cir. 2000)
(affirmed for defendant); Bagley v. Ameritech Corp., 220 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirmed for
defendant); Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Mgmt., Inc., 114 F.3rd 1190 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirmed for defendant);
Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirmed for defendant); Alexis v.
McDonald’s Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirmed for defendant); Perry v.
Command Performance, 945 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992) (reversed
for plaintiff); Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990) (reversed for plaintiff).
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FIGURE 5 | FEDERAL APPEALS COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (§ 1981 CLAIMS)
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%

Trial court finding for Plaintiff (N=0 cases)
Trial court finding for Defendant (N=22 cases)

70.0%
60.0%

54.5%
45.5%

50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%

10.0%
0.0%

Affirmed on appeal

Reversed on appeal

In contrast with the mixed outcomes for § 1981 claims, only one of the
decisions regarding Title II claims was reversed on appeal in favor of the
plaintiff,408 while six were affirmed.409

408. Dunaway, 436 F. App’x at 386 (reversed for plaintiff).
409. Menchu, 669 F. App’x at 361 (affirmed for defendant); Daugherty v. The Heights, 477 F.
App’x 407 (8th Cir., 2012) (affirmed for defendant); Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d
344, 349 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirmed for defendant); Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d
427 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirmed for defendant); Lizardo, 270 F.3d at 94 (affirmed for defendant);
Vaughn,114 F.3rd at 1190 (affirmed for defendant).
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FIGURE 6 | FEDERAL APPEALS COURT DECISIONS ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (TITLE II CLAIMS)
100.0%
90.0%

85.7%

80.0%

70.0%

Trial court finding for Plaintiff
(N= 0 cases)
Trial court finding for Defendant
(N= 7 cases)

60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%

14.3%

10.0%
0.0%

Affirmed on appeal

Reversed on appeal

The most common reason cited by courts in affirming summary judgment
was that the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for their
behavior.410 One such reason is when the defendant suspected the plaintiff of
theft. Jones v. J.C. Penney’s Department Stores Inc. involved a plaintiff who
brought suit after being arrested for suspected shoplifting from defendant’s
store.411 The appeals court affirmed the grant of defendant’s motion for
summary judgment because Jones could not present any direct evidence of
racial animus to rebut defendant’s proffered interest in preventing
shoplifting.412 Jones did put forth evidence that a manager of defendant’s
store stated a seemingly inconsistent reason (“among other reasons”): that
Jones, an African American woman, was not in an age-appropriate
department—the women’s clothing department.413 However, the court held

410. See, e.g., Jones, 317 F. App’x at 71; Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Mgmt., Inc., No. 95-CV-70282, 1996
WL 426445 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 01, 1996).
411. Jones, 317 F. App’x at 75.
412. See id. at 74–75.
413. Id. at 72, 74.
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that a mere scintilla of evidence, such as this statement, was not enough to
preclude summary judgment in favor of the defendant.414
Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Management presents a case where plaintiffs sued
under § 1981 after security officers asked them to leave a mall.415 The district
court found “no question that the plaintiffs were denied access to the mall,”
but granted summary judgment to the defendants after agreeing they had a
non-discriminatory reason for denying them such access.416 Similar to the
previous case, the plaintiffs tried to demonstrate that there were
inconsistencies in the testimony of the mall officers who provided differing
standards for when they would ask groups to disperse.417 The plaintiffs
additionally employed a group of seven White males, a similar number as
plaintiffs’ group, to visit the mall and test whether they would be asked by
officers to disperse.418
In granting summary judgment for defendants, the district court noted that
mall policy allowed for flexibility in officer discretion in asking crowds to
disperse and that the White testers did not visit the mall under the same
conditions as the plaintiff group.419 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the district court’s reasoning and affirmed the decision.420
In cases where racial epithets were used, plaintiffs tended to be more
successful. An example is Green v. Dillard’s, Inc. involving an African
American couple who were subjected to hostile treatment.421 Linda McCrary,
a Dillard’s employee, called plaintiffs “n-----s” as they attempted to purchase
a wristwatch and other merchandise from a Dillard’s store.422 The trial court
granted Dillard’s motion for summary judgment holding that plaintiffs were
able to complete their purchases before being confronted with the racial

414. Id.
415. 1996 WL 426445, at *1.
416. Id. at *3, *7.
417. Id. at *3–5. One defendant said she would break up groups only if they interfered with traffic
flow. Id. at *4. Another said he would disperse groups of over four people. Id. at *4. “Some officers
enforced the group prohibition against families [while] others [would] not.” Id. at *4.
418. Id. at *7.
419. Id. at *3, *7 (“The testers were sent to the mall on a week day [sic], December 22, 1994, at
10:00 a.m. . . . [T]he incident at issue occurred around 5:00 p.m. on a Saturday when the mall was
crowded.”).
420. Vaughn v. N.S.B.F. Mgmt., Inc., 114 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1997).
421. Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2007).
422. Id. at 535.
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slurs.423 According to the court, plaintiffs no longer had any contractual
interest at stake.424 In addition, McCrary’s refusal to help plaintiffs did not
constitute a § 1981 violation because she did not prevent other Dillard’s
employees from assisting plaintiffs.425
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision.426 Holding that § 1981 protected the plaintiffs’ right to shop on the
same terms as White customers, the court concluded that the evidence at hand,
the use of slurs, refusal to help them, and following them, constituted a series
of actions which a trier of fact could determine thwarted the plaintiffs’ attempt
to purchase the wristwatch.427 The use of slurs constituted direct evidence of
discriminatory intent, allowing plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.428
In Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, the appeals court reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant.429 The incident in
the case concerned a mother and son who visited a private club, The Order of
Eagles Local 555, for a party.430 They were the only two Black guests present
and were subjected to hostile treatment and racist remarks, despite having
been invited by the guests of honor.431 The appeals court held that because no
White guests were turned away, trying to turn away the Watsons constituted
a violation of their ability to contract on the same terms as similarly situated
members of a non-protected class, thereby contravening § 1981.432
Likewise, in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., the defendants made
overt statements about the plaintiff’s race.433 The fact that plaintiff was
refused the ability to purchase a hair coloring appointment for her mother
constituted a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the refusal was on
race-based grounds.434 That, the court of appeals held, is all § 1981

423. Id. at 537.
424. Id.
425. Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1056 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
426. Green, 483 F.3d 541.
427. Id. at 535, 539.
428. Id. at 540.
429. 915 F.2d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 1990).
430. Id. at 237–38.
431. Id. at 238–39.
432. Id. at 243. Plaintiffs’ Title II claim was dismissed on summary judgment because Local 555
qualified as a private establishment, exempting it from Title II. Id. at 237.
433. 456 F.3d 427, 435 (4th Cir. 2006).
434. Id. at 436.
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requires.435 The court reversed the district court decision finding in favor of
plaintiff’s § 1981 claim.436
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION IN THE
PLATFORM ECONOMY
Examining cases involving discrimination in places of public
accommodations reveals the weaknesses in our current laws as well as
potential arguments to be made against defendant online platforms.437 Title
II’s narrow list of places of public accommodations provides an opening
through which defendants can escape being covered by the statute.438 As seen
in Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, common establishments such as beauty
salons are likely to be excluded by courts that read the statute narrowly.439
Today, as businesses’ use of new technologies floods the marketplace, the
antiquated listing of places of public accommodation is becoming
increasingly out of touch. This poses problems for plaintiffs who purchase
goods and services from online platforms that did not exist when the statute
was written. Nearing its sixtieth birthday, Title II is in need of a makeover.
The focus must be on the functional aspects of the covered entities rather
than their mere technical features in defining places of public
accommodations. For example, in Philadelphia Electric Co.440 and Arnett v.
Domino’s Pizza I, LLC,441 state courts interpreted both the state and federal
laws as limiting places of public accommodation to physical brick and mortar
facilities. State and federal laws now must account for the fact that
discrimination is just as likely to occur in the car of a ride-sharing driver or
the home of an Airbnb host as at corporate headquarters. Consumer
discrimination is invidious regardless of where it happens. As such, we
propose that the law be amended or reinforced by regulations that broaden the
definition of places of public accommodation to include the locations where

435. Id.
436. Id. at 437.
437. See generally Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 Geo. L.J. 1271 (2017) (arguing public accommodation
laws need to change to address present challenges brought by the platform economy).
438. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012).
439. Denny, 456 F.3d at 434.
440. 290 A.2d 699, 703 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
441. 124 S.W.3d 529, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
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services are actually received.
In addition, clarification is needed to guide courts in interpreting the right
to “enjoyment of all benefits . . . of the contractual relationship.”442 This
would require that § 1981 be amended to emphasize that a contractual
relationship can begin before and end after the point of sale transaction takes
place.443 In Youngblood, the court ruled that plaintiff’s § 1981 claim failed
because the alleged discrimination occurred after he bought beef-jerky from
defendant’s store.444 The Eighth Circuit distinguished the case at hand from
Hampton v. Dillard Department Stores Inc., a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision.445 In that case, the court held that the defendant department store
owed the plaintiff, Ms. Hampton, a continuing contractual duty after Ms.
Hampton had completed her purchase at the store and then was prevented
from using a coupon the store gave her for a subsequent transaction there
moments later.446 According to the Youngblood court, the issuance of the
coupon in Hampton constituted a post-sale event that created a further
contractual duty.447
Both changes could be achieved through statutory amendments or the
development of a regulatory regime similar to the scheme coordinated by the
U.S. Attorney General to prosecute fair housing discrimination claims or the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in enforcing Title VII
claims.448 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and local
consumer organizations could “investigate discrimination in public
accommodations offered in the sharing economy” and enforce Title II and
§ 1981 against wrongdoers.449
Another obstacle that is certain to arise in the sharing economy is the issue
of just how many host or driver denials constitute a denial of the right to
contract on the app under § 1981. What if one Uber driver refuses to serve a
plaintiff, but the plaintiff is able to find another one? In Green, the plaintiffs’

442. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2012).
443. See id.
444. Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2001).
445. Id. at 854 (distinguishing Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t. Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir.
2001)).
446. Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1100.
447. Id.
448. See Norrinda Brown Hayat, Accommodating Bias in the Sharing Economy, 83 BROOK. L. REV.
613, 644 (2018).
449. Id.

115

[Vol. 48: 59, 2021]

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

claim overcame summary judgment on appeal because the court held that
while the plaintiffs may still have been able to contract through another
employee, the denial of service by one violated their ability to contract on the
same terms as White customers.450 If one employee can refuse service, what
is to prevent another employee from doing so? A consumer in the platform
economy must not be at the mercy of the individual providers, such as drivers
or hosts, to be able to contract.
In addition, equipping the law for the challenges posed by the sharing
economy should account for the “similarly situated” test.451 This test has been
almost insurmountable for plaintiffs in traditional venues such as restaurants
or clothing stores.452 However, online platforms have rich data about every
transaction that consumers make through their app.453 A practical method for
proving differential treatment involves obtaining the data through the
discovery process and analyzing the data to identify disparities in the
provision of services to people based on race or ethnicity (or membership in
other protected categories).454
This type of analysis is being used in other cases where disparate
treatment is alleged.455 For example, social scientists have studied the traffic
citations issued by law enforcement officers who patrol roads and
highways.456 Comparing the proportion of citations issued by a particular
officer to motorists based on their demographics to those written by his or her
colleagues can provide evidence of discrimination.457
In Commonwealth v. Lora, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that it is permissible to offer “statistical evidence demonstrating disparate
450. See Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2007).
451. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 849–50 (2002).
452. See, e.g., Hynes v. Brasil LLC, No. CV H-17-2419, 2018 WL 1726157, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 10, 2018) (holding that plaintiff failed to prove others outside of his protected class were treated
fairly because there were no other restaurant patrons in the exact situation as the plaintiff); Acey v.
Bob Evans Farms, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-04916, 2014 WL 989201, at *10–11 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 13, 2014)
(holding that plaintiff failed to show that non-members of his protected class were treated more fairly
than members of his protected class and that services were refused at the restaurant).
453. See Kenney & Zysman, supra note 20.
454. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 22, at 1314.
455. See, e.g., Shaun L. Gabbidon, Racial Profiling by Store Clerks and Security Personnel in Retail
Establishments: An Exploration of “Shopping While Black,” 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 345, 346
(2003) https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.513.3130&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
456. See id.
457. See id.
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treatment of persons based on their race” to meet the burden of establishing
racial discrimination.458 Such evidence was found sufficient only to meet the
initial burden of alleging an inference of discrimination.459 Likewise, a social
scientist could present statistical evidence by analyzing the cancellation rates
of a particular Uber or Lyft driver, for example.
The analyses could inquire into whether a driver cancels more often when
passengers are Black or Latinx than when they are White.460 Similar analyses
could explore whether any disparities exist in the wait times for passengers of
different races who request rides from a particular driver. Data showing the
ratings provided by a driver (or host) pertaining to passengers (or guests) of
different ethnicities could be mined as well.461 The results of these types of
analyses could reveal disparities in the race or ethnicity of the passengers (or
guests) whose requests are canceled, who experience longer wait times, and
who are rated more negatively after their ride with an Uber or Lyft driver or
after their stay with an Airbnb host.
In determining whether a host or driver treats certain people in a disparate
manner, plaintiff’s counsel can also obtain the reviews written about the
individual. Again, accessing the data should be relatively easy for online
platforms. If a significant proportion of an individual’s reviews allege
discrimination, then those reviews can be used as evidence against the
individual. In addition, counsel can present evidence of complaints filed
against a particular driver or host.
Furthermore, users of online platforms can gather evidence of
discrimination by concealing their identity. In the past, trained testers were
needed to ferret out discriminatory practices.462 Today, anyone can conduct
tests by creating different profiles as Gregory Selden did. Armed with the
results of such tests, plaintiffs are more likely to prove that they were treated
differently than similarly-situated customers who do not belong to their
protected category.
One potential weapon for online platforms in defending against claims of
consumer discrimination is § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which
458. 886 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Mass. 2008).
459. See id. at 701; see also Commonwealth v. Long, 152 N.E.3d 725 (Mass. 2020).
460. See Josh Magness, Black Passengers Wait Longer for Ubers, Taxis—and Get More
Cancellations,
Study
Finds,
MIAMI HERALD
(June
28,
2018,
11:29
AM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article213982579.html.
461. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 22, at 1312.
462. See Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 2004).
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states, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”463 In Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v.
Facebook, Inc., Facebook successfully invoked § 230 to defeat a Title II claim
by the plaintiff who claimed that Facebook blocked access to the Sikhs for
Justice Facebook page at the behest of the government of India.464 Certainly,
there are valid policy arguments that internet service providers should not be
liable for comments that are rude or defamatory. However, an exception must
be carved out to remove the shield from comments and statements that are
discriminatory and designed to discourage minority consumers from taking
part in the platform’s services.
Section 230 immunity may not apply if an online platform is deemed to
force users to reveal content that may invite discrimination from other users.
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C.
featured an instance where the website Roommates.com was sued by local fair
housing councils over its requirement that new members disclose
characteristics such as sex and sexual orientation when registering a new
profile on the site.465 Writing for the majority, Judge Kozinski stated that
§ 230 does not provide “immunity for inducing third parties to express illegal
preferences.”466
Neither Uber nor Airbnb require users to disclose their race when
registering for profiles.467 However, Roommates.com still provides an
interesting look at how online platforms could face liability, despite § 230,
based on aspects of user profiles that could invite discrimination.468 The
outcome of the Roommates.com case may have served as part of the impetus
for Airbnb to change its policy that had allowed hosts to request the photos of
prospective guests before accepting bookings.
Any suggestions for amending § 230 come at an opportune time as policymakers are currently engaged in discussions regarding the law’s future.469

463.
464.
2017).
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
AM),
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47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom., 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir.
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1165.
See Leong & Belzer, supra note 20, at 1308.
See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165.
See Lauren Feiner, Big Tech’s Favorite Law is Under Fire, CNBC TECH (Feb. 19, 2020, 7:40
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/what-is-section-230-and-why-do-some-people-want-to-
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Critical of § 230 and deeming that it “has been interpreted quite broadly by
the courts,” U.S. Attorney General William Barr has directed the Justice
Department to study § 230, and the consumer protection subcommittee of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce has held hearings on deepfakes
and digital deception.470 Although some politicians, including Joe Biden,
support a complete repeal of § 230, the majority view appears to support
limiting the law’s protections rather than scrapping it entirely.471 Carving a
racial discrimination exception into § 230 provides one such way to limit the
“liability shield” provided by the law and shift the balance in a more equitable
direction between providers and consumers.472
Finally, the decision in Harrington v. Airbnb represents an entrée for
future victims of discrimination in the platform economy.473 In order to prove
that a company intended to treat certain customers differently than others,
plaintiffs can present evidence that the company received notice about
discriminatory activity on its platform.474 If a particular design feature
contributes to the disparate treatment of a particular group of customers, the
company could be expected to redesign or remove the feature to avoid facing
the risk of liability.475
V. CONCLUSION
Thirty years ago, social scientists turned their attention to the issue of
consumer discrimination. Ian Ayres conducted a pioneering study of new car
sales in the Chicago area marketplace and found that dealership sales practices
resulted in White men paying the least for new cars and Black women paying
the most.476 White women and Black men were second and third,
change-it.html.
470. See id.
471. See id.
472. See id. Representative Jan Schakowsky, the chair of the consumer protection subcommittee,
stated that “right now, we think the balance favors those who want a liability shield, and [it] goes way
too far in that sense.” Id. (alteration in original).
473. 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (D. Or. 2018).
474. See id. at 1090–91.
475. See id. at 1090; see also Eric Goldman, Racial Discrimination Lawsuit Against Airbnb Has the
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respectively, in the competition for good value.477 Other researchers followed
suit and still others explored perceptions of consumer discrimination among
Black and White respondents.478 Recently, marketing scholars examined
lending institutions to identify any racial disparities in their practices and
found customer choice to be restricted due to lenders’ assumptions about them
based on race.479
Legal scholars studying the phenomenon of race-based discrimination
identified potential avenues for redress for consumers of color as well as the
shortcomings of the law in addressing the problem. Thirty years later, we see
that courts have not adapted to the reality of the multicultural marketplace
where consumers face daily micro-aggressions. Unfortunately, the subtle
racism that pervades our society continues to infect consumer transactions,
even those conducted via online platforms. From a functional perspective,
online platforms share much in common with the establishments known as
“places of public accommodations” because they are businesses that provide
services to and interact with the public at large. If accountability for all
businesses, including online platforms, cannot be achieved through market
forces, then the law must evolve to prevent businesses from facilitating
discrimination with impunity.
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AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (2007).
479. See Sterling A. Bone, Glenn L. Christensen & Jerome D. Williams, Rejected, Shackled, and
Alone: The Impact of Systemic Restricted Choice on Minority Consumers’ Construction of Self, 41 J.
CONSUMER. RES. 451, 460 (2014).
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